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Process and Reconciliation: Integrating
the Duty to Consult with Environmental
Assessment
PROFESSOR NEIL CRAIK*
As the duty to consult Aboriginal peoples is operationalized within the frameworks of
government decision making, the relevant agencies are increasingly turning to environmental
assessment (EA) processes as one of the principal vehicles for carrying out those
consultations. This article explores the practical and theoretical dimensions of using EA
processes to implement the duty to consult and accommodate. The relationship between EA
and the duty to consult has arisen in a number of cases and a clear picture is emerging of the
steps that agencies conducting EAs must carry out in order to discharge their constitutional
obligations to Aboriginal peoples. The article examines the implementation of the duty to
consult through various stages of EA processes, identifying the EA practices that are best
able to satisfy the legal requirements and the aspirations of the duty to consult, as well
as to identify areas that are likely to present challenges moving forward. The article also
considers a broader approach to EA that is more likely to contribute to the overarching goal of
reconciliation, arguing that greater attention must be paid to the deliberative and justificatory
qualities of EA.
Alors que le devoir de consulter les Premières Nations est intégré au cadre de la prise
de décision des gouvernements, les organismes intervenants adoptent de plus en plus
un processus d’évaluation environnementale (EE) comme l’un des principaux véhicules
permettant de procéder à ces consultations. Cet article explore les dimensions pratiques et
théoriques de l’utilisation d’un processus d’EE pour mettre en œuvre le devoir de consulter
et respecter. La relation entre l’EE et le devoir de consulter s’est imposée dans un certain
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nombre de cas et les étapes que les organismes responsables des EE doivent suivre afin de
s’acquitter de leurs obligations constitutionnelles envers les Premières Nations commencent
à se préciser. L’article examine la mise en œuvre du devoir de consulter à travers les diverses
étapes du processus d’EE, identifiant les pratiques d’EE les mieux susceptibles de satisfaire
aux exigences juridiques et aux aspirations du devoir de consulter, identifiant également
les secteurs susceptibles de poser problème à l’avenir. L’article considère également une
plus large approche de l’EE qui sera mieux susceptible de contribuer à l’objectif principal
de la réconciliation, proposant qu’il faudra porter une plus grande attention aux qualités
délibératives et justificatives de l’EE.
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AS THE DUTY TO CONSULT ABORIGINAL PEOPLES becomes operationalized

within the frameworks of government decision making, the agencies responsible
for operationalizing the duty are increasingly turning to environmental assessment
(EA) processes as one of the principal vehicles for carrying out consultations.
There is a pragmatic attractiveness to using EA processes to implement the duty
to consult where the activity in question is subject to EA, since much of the
information and analysis of the environmental effects of a proposed activity will
be required to assess the impacts of that same activity on Aboriginal rights and
interests. Integrating these processes is efficient because it minimizes the need for
multiple consultations. In addition, since consultations in one sphere may impact
the scope of the activity under consideration in the other sphere—for example,
consultations within the EA may result in project modifications that would
have implications for the duty to consult Aboriginal people—the processes of
consultation under the duty to consult and in EA are, to some degree, inseparable.
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The inextricability of these obligations does not, however, mean that the
duty to consult and EA fit together with ease or without important implications
for one another. Integrating the duty to consult with environment assessment
requires careful consideration of the unique obligations owed to Aboriginal
people and the constitutional nature of those obligations. This article explores the
practical and theoretical dimensions of using EA processes to implement the duty
to consult. On the practical side, while EA has been identified by governments
as the preferred avenue by which the duty to consult ought to be implemented,
there remain questions about the limits of EA to satisfy the duty to consult across
its many variations. Since the Supreme Court of Canada’s trilogy of decisions in
Haida Nation, Taku River, and Mikisew,1 the relationship between EA and the
duty to consult has arisen in a number of cases and a clearer picture is emerging
of the steps that agencies conducting EAs must carry out in order to discharge
their constitutional obligations to Aboriginal peoples.
The relationship between EA and the duty to consult goes beyond a
functional connection. Both are processes of reconciliation. The central purpose
of EA is the generation of harmony between the natural environment and
development activities; such a process requires balancing competing social goals
and contested values.2 With the duty to consult, the goal of reconciliation seeks
to achieve “the reconciliation of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies with
the sovereignty of the Crown.”3 In practice, reconciliation in the Aboriginal law
context requires balancing the rights and interests of Aboriginal groups with
those of non-Aboriginals.4
The common purpose of reconciliation leads to both processes sharing a
similar structural form. Both are primarily procedural obligations and can be
discharged through careful attention to process considerations, such as notice,
meaningful participation, and reasoned justification of decisions. The assumption
that underlies both EA and the duty to consult is that by requiring decision
1.

2.
3.
4.

Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73, [2004] 3 SCR 511
[Haida]; Taku River Tlingit First Nation v British Columbia (Project Assessment Director),
2004 SCC 74, [2004] 3 SCR 550 [Taku River]; Mikisew Cree First Nation v Canada
(Minister of Canadian Heritage), 2005 SCC 69, [2005] 3 SCR 388 [Mikisew].
See e.g. Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, SC 2012, c 19, s 52(4) [CEAA];
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 USC 4321 §101(a) (1969) [NEPA].
Behn v Moulton Contracting, 2013 SCC 26 at para 28, [2013] 2 SCR 227 [Behn].
Taku River, supra note 1 at para 42 (“the Crown is bound by its honour to balance societal
and Aboriginal interests in making decisions that may affect Aboriginal claims”); Beckman v
Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, 2010 SCC 53 at para 10, [2010] 2 SCR 103 [Beckman].
See also ibid at para 103, Deschamps J.
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makers to consider the impacts of an activity on the natural environment or on
the rights and interests of Aboriginal peoples, those interests will be accounted
for and reflected in the outcome of the decision, notwithstanding the absence of
formal substantive obligations to arrive at a particular result within either process.
However, EA obligations and the duty to consult go beyond process. Neither
is ambivalent about the outcomes it produces. The substantive aspect of EA is
captured by the commitment to avoid “significant adverse environmental effects”
caused by projects and activities subject to EA and to promote sustainable
development.5 The substantive aspect of Aboriginal consultation is expressed
through the duty to accommodate, which is similarly defined as “taking steps
to avoid irreparable harm or to minimize the effects of infringement.”6 The
substantive goals of EA are achieved indirectly by requiring that significant
impacts be identified and disclosed. Mitigation is encouraged, but the structure
of EA is such that the government may ultimately decide that the benefits of a
project outweigh its environmental risks.7 Accommodation, on the other hand,
has, at least formally, a different structure owing to its constitutional nature. The
Crown’s discretion to subordinate Aboriginal interests to competing public goals
is more constrained, and in cases of infringement of established rights, is subject
to a high threshold of justification.8
The principal aim of this article is to examine both the promise and limitations
of using EA to implement the duties to consult and accommodate. At the heart
of this inquiry is the extent to which careful attention to procedural requirements
can bring about substantive ends.9 In particular, I consider the prospects of EA
contributing to a “generative” process of constitutional redefinition,10 which is to
ask: To what extent can EA help build shared understandings among Aboriginal
peoples and the Crown with respect to the evolving constitutional “compact”
between the non-Aboriginal population and Aboriginal peoples?11

5.
6.
7.
8.

CEAA, supra note 2, s 4.
Haida, supra note 1 at para 47.
CEAA, supra note 2, s 4(2).
Brian Slattery, “Aboriginal Rights and the Honour of the Crown” (2005) 29 SCLR
(2d) 433 at 436.
9. A Dan Tarlock has performed a seminal exploration of the relationship between process and
substance in environmental law. See A Dan Tarlock, “Is There a There in Environmental
Law?” (2004) 19:2 J Land Use & Envtl L 213.
10. Slattery, supra note 8 at 440. Slattery notes that the SCC has attributed a generative role to
section 35 of the Charter. The SCC references this function in Rio Tinto Alcan Inc v Carrier
Sekani Tribal Council, 2010 SCC 43 at para 38, [2010] 2 SCR 650 [Rio Tinto].
11. Beckman, supra note 4 at paras 97-98.
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The approach is principally descriptive in nature, and is intended to provide
legal guidance to those persons engaged in EA processes that are being called
upon to satisfy the duty to consult. I also put forward a normative argument.
Here, the central claim is that if EA is to successfully meet the underlying
goal of reconciliation, then those engaged in EA processes must adopt an
understanding of EA that recognizes that it is not simply a technical process of
impact identification and assessment—it is also a process that has transformative
potential. In effect, EA processes ought to be understood as having the potential
for genuine deliberation. While the EA process does not dictate particular
substantive outcomes, EA requirements do necessitate that the procedural
conditions give rise to “meaningful” consultation and good faith, which I argue
requires that the parties must be open to reconsidering their interests in light of
the factual and normative information that emerges within the EA process. This
is an objective that has to date been underappreciated by administrative officials
and courts, but one that is integral to the duty to consult and accommodate.
In effect, participation in, and justification of, decisions in light of mutually
acceptable reasons provides greater opportunities for Aboriginal co-authorship
of the policy decisions that affect their rights and interests, which in turn has the
potential for both the Crown and Aboriginal groups to generate a set of shared
normative expectations that lay at the heart of the notion of reconciliation.
The article proceeds in three parts. Part I considers the proceduralized nature
of EA and the duty to consult. In this Part, I examine the parallels and divergences
between the structures of EA and the duty to consult. In Part II, which forms the
central focus of the article, I look more specifically at stages of the EA process and
how the duty to consult is being implemented through EA, and how Canadian
courts understand the interaction between these processes. The focus here is on
identifying the EA practices that are best able to satisfy the legal requirements and
the aspirations of the duty to consult, as well as to identify areas that are likely
to present challenges moving forward. Finally, in Part III, I return to the theme
of process and reconciliation, and more specifically to the prospects of process
obligations to contribute to a renewed constitutional order.
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I. THE DUTY TO CONSULT AND ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT: THE TURN TO PROCESS
A. THE DUTY TO CONSULT AND ACCOMMODATE

The duty to consult as a distinct constitutional requirement was established in its
present form by the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) in Haida12 and Taku River13
and has been elaborated upon in three subsequent SCC decisions: Mikisew,14 Rio
Tinto,15 and Beckman.16 The duty to consult arises out of the broader principle
of the honour of Crown,17 which places a general duty on the Crown in their
dealings with Aboriginal people to determine, recognize, and respect the rights
of Aboriginal peoples.18 In the context of treaty negotiation and interpretation,
the honour of Crown requires the avoidance of ‘sharp dealing’ and imposes an
overarching obligation of fairness on the Crown in their dealings with Aboriginal
peoples. The honour of the Crown has been invoked in support of the obligation
of the Crown to consult Aboriginal peoples in the face of infringements of
established Aboriginal rights, with consultation becoming a critical consideration
in determining whether a government action that infringes an established
Aboriginal right is justified.19
In Haida Nation, the Court recognized that the honour of the Crown extends
the duty to consult to circumstances where Aboriginal rights are claimed, but are
yet to be proved. Allowing the Crown unfettered authority to undertake activities
that may affect asserted but unproven claims could permit the Crown to adversely

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Supra note 1.
Supra note 1.
Supra note 1.
Supra note 10.
Supra note 4.
See Slattery, supra note 8. See also Thomas Isaac & Anthony Knox, “The Crown’s Duty to
Consult Aboriginal People” (2003) 41:1 Alta L Rev 49.
18. Haida Nation, supra note 1 at para 25.
19. R v Sparrow, 1990 SCC 104 at 1114, [1990] 1 SCR 1075 [Sparrow].
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affect the subject matter of ongoing negotiation.20 In these circumstances, the
honour of the Crown serves to protect these contingent rights.21
In Mikisew, the question before the Court was whether a Crown activity
that was contemplated under a historic treaty—in this case, the taking up of
surrendered land for road purposes—was nevertheless subject to the duty to
consult. In holding that a duty to consult existed in these circumstances, the
Court maintains that the honour of the Crown does not come to an end once
treaties are negotiated. In this instance, the Crown remained obligated to consult
since its activities had potentially adverse effects on the rights secured under the
treaty. To hold otherwise would undermine the goal of reconciliation, which is
understood by the court as a continual process, not as a destination that is reached
upon concluding a treaty. The SCC made this point clear in Haida Nation, when
Chief Justice McLachlin noted: “Reconciliation is not a final legal remedy in the
usual sense. Rather, it is a process flowing from rights guaranteed by s. 35(1) of
the Constitution Act, 1982.”22
Because the nature and strength of the Aboriginal claim will vary and the
degree of impact from the government action will be dependent on the particular
context of the activity in question, these requirements give rise to a duty that
varies in its content. The SCC has evoked the concept of a spectrum to illustrate
how the content of the duty to consult varies:
At one end of the spectrum lie cases where the claim to title is weak, the Aboriginal
right limited, or the potential infringement minor. In such cases the only duty on
the Crown may be to give notice, disclose information, and discuss any issues raised
in response to the notice.
At the other end of the spectrum lie cases where a strong prima facie case for the
claim is established, the right and potential infringement is of high significance
to the Aboriginal peoples, and the risk on non-compensable damage is high. In
such cases deep consultation, aimed at finding a satisfactory interim solution,
may be required. While precise requirements will vary with the circumstances, the
consultation required at this stage may entail the opportunity to make submissions
for consideration, formal participation in the decision-making process, and

20. Haida Nation, supra note 1 at para 27.
21. Rio Tinto, supra note 10 at para 33. Chief Justice McLachlin writes:
The duty to consult … derives from the need to protect Aboriginal interests while land and
resource claims are ongoing or when the proposed action may impinge on a Aboriginal
right. Absent this duty, Aboriginal groups seeking to protect their interests pending a final
settlement would need to commence litigation and seek interlocutory injunctions to halt the
threatening activity.

22. Haida Nation, supra note 1 at para 32 [emphasis added].
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provision of written reasons to show that Aboriginal concerns were considered and
to reveal the impact they had on the decision.23

The honour of the Crown not only demands adherence to procedural
requirements, but it also imposes a duty to accommodate. This duty is triggered
where the prima facie case for the Aboriginal claim is strong and the activity is
likely to have “significant” adverse effects.24 While the trigger looks very much like
the requirement for deep consultation noted above, the duty to accommodate is
best understood as a distinct obligation in the sense that a duty to consult at the
lower end of the spectrum may still yield an obligation to accommodate, and an
obligation for deep consultation will not necessarily require accommodation.25
The duty to accommodate reveals itself through consultation.26 As a result, any
consultation, to be meaningful, must entertain the possibility of accommodation.27
In Wii’litswx v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), the court found that “[a]
n assessment of whether consultation was meaningful inevitably leads to an
examination of what accommodations were reached.”28
The precise content of the duty to accommodate remains ill-defined.29 The
SCC describes the duty as “taking steps to avoid irreparable harm or to minimize
the effects of infringement.”30 In its guidelines, the Federal government notes,
“[t]he primary goal of accommodation is to avoid, eliminate, or minimize the
adverse impacts on potential or established Aboriginal or Treaty rights, and when
this is not possible, to compensate the Aboriginal community for those adverse
impacts.”31 While the duty to accommodate is structured as a substantive right,
23. Ibid at paras 43-44.
24. Ibid at para 47.
25. See Ka’A’Gee Tu First Nation v Canada (Attorney General), 2012 FC 297 at para 122, [2015]
2 CNLR 28 [KTFN] (“[t]he duty to accommodate is not a free-standing legal right”).
26. Haida Nation, supra note 1 at para 47; KTFN, supra note 25. In KTFN, the Court quoted
Blanchard J’s duty to consult analysis, noting that “the extent and nature of accommodation,
if any, can only be ascertained after meaningful consultation” (ibid at para 38).
27. Mikisew, supra note 1 at para 54.
28. 2008 BCSC 1139 at para 179, [2008], 4 CNLR 315 [Wii’litswx].
29. Lorne Sossin, “The Duty to Consult and Accommodate: Procedural Justice as Aboriginal
Rights” (2010) 23:1 Can J Admin L & Prac 93 at 107; Dwight Newman, Revisiting The Duty
to Consult Aboriginal Peoples (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2014) at 103-06.
30. Haida, supra note 1 at para 47.
31. Consultation that excludes from the outset any form of accommodation would be
meaningless. See Minister of the Department of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern
Development Canada, Aboriginal Consultation and Accommodation: Updated Guidelines
for Federal Officials to Fulfill the Duty to Consult (Ottawa: Indigenous and Northern Affairs
Canada, 2011) at 53 [Federal Guidelines].
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the judicial treatment of the duty has severely curtailed its substantive effect by
characterizing the duty as being satisfied through negotiation and compromise, as
opposed to through the determination of formal legal rights: “[A]ccommodation
requires that Aboriginal concerns be balanced reasonably with the potential
impact of the particular decision on those concerns and with competing societal
concerns. Compromise is inherent to the reconciliation process.”32 It follows that
the duty to accommodate in the context of unproven or undefined Aboriginal
rights does not include a veto.33 The result is to conflate the substantive content
of the duty to accommodate with a form of process obligation, a point alluded
to by the SCC: “Where consultation is meaningful, there is no ultimate duty
to reach agreement.”34 The SCC’s deference to government discretion in
connection with this duty—the standard of review for determination of whether
the duty to consult and accommodate has been fulfilled is reasonableness—is
consonant with an understanding that these duties require political, as opposed
to judicial, competencies.35
B. ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT

Environmental assessment has become a central pillar of the environmental
regulatory system in Canada and, indeed, around the world.36 The logic of
environment assessment is straightforward. Prior to making decisions that may
have adverse impacts on the natural environment, decision makers should inform
themselves of the potential environmental consequences of their decision, and
should inform and consult other government agencies and the public.37 In order
to bring this examination about, environmental assessment legislation prescribes
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Taku River, supra note 1 at para 2.
Haida, supra note 1 at para 48.
Taku River, supra note 1 at para 2.
Haida, supra note 1 at para 62.
Richard Morgan, “Environmental Impact Assessment: The State of the Art” (2012)
30:1 Impact Assessment & Project Appraisal 5 at 5-6 (noting the globalized nature of
EIA processes).
37. It is difficult to essentialize EA, and different decision makers may seek to impose a more
rigorous and sustainably-oriented approach, emphasizing not only bio-physical harm
mitigation, but also seeking positive contributions to environmental, social, and economic
sustainability. See e.g. Robert Gibson, “Favouring the Higher Test: Contribution to
Sustainability as the Central Criterion for Reviews and Decisions Under the Canadian
Environmental Assessment Act” (2000) 10 J Envtl L & Prac 39 [Gibson, “Contribution to
Sustainability”]. The discussion that follows focuses on the legislative and judicial approaches
to EA processes in Canada, which have tended to emphasize harm mitigation. I return to the
issue of a more expansive understanding of EA in Part III, below.
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a set of procedural requirements that determine the level of scrutiny to which a
project will be subject, the scope and content of the assessment itself, and the
degree of public engagement.38 The procedural orientation of environmental
assessment is captured in Friends of Oldman River, where the SCC describes EA
in the following terms:
Environmental impact assessment is, in its simplest form, a planning tool that is
now generally regarded as an integral component of sound decision-making. …
As a planning tool it has both an information-gathering and decision-making
component which provide the decision-makers with an objective basis for granting
or denying approval for a proposed development. … In short, environmental impact
assessment is simply descriptive of a process of decision-making.39

The precise procedural requirements of EA are variable and responsive to
the potential level of environmental harm, and can range from cursory reports
prepared by proponents or authorizing agencies with little or no opportunities
for direct consultation to hearings before independent tribunals who prepare
recommendations for statutory decision makers. The underlying logic is to match
the procedural requirements with the degree of environment risk posed.
As suggested by the SCC, EA is not a regulatory instrument in the sense
that EA legislation does not require adherence to pre-determined environmental
outcomes in the manner that traditional command-and-control regulations, such
as emission standards, do.40 That said, EA processes are very clearly intended to
influence outcomes, and in this regard EA legislation identifies substantive goals,
such as the avoidance of significant environmental effects and the promotion
of sustainable development.41 However, the environmental goals towards which
EA is directed are identified in such broad terms that, on their own, they put
very little constraint on government activity. Ultimately, even where an EA
discloses significant environmental impacts, it remains open for the government
to proceed with the activity in question. The Supreme Court of the United States
38. Christopher Wood, Environmental Impact Assessment: A Comparative Review, 2nd ed
(New York: Routlege, 2003); Jane Holder, Environmental Assessment: The Regulation of
Decision Making (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 6; Bram Noble, Introduction to
Environmental Impact Assessment: A Guide to Principles and Practice, 2nd ed (Don Mills, ON:
Oxford University Press, 2010).
39. Friends of the Oldman River Society v Canada (Minister of Transport), [1992] 1 SCR 3 at
para 103, 94 Alta LR (2d) 129 [Friends of Oldman River]. See also MiningWatch Canada v
Canada (Fisheries and Oceans), 2010 SCC 2 at para 14, [2010] 1 SCR 6 [MiningWatch].
40. Richard Stewart, “A New Generation of Environmental Regulation” (2001) 29 Capital UL
Rev 21 at 140-41 (describing EIA processes as a form of reflexive law).
41. CEAA, supra note 2, s 4.
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(USSC) captured the procedural dynamic of EA when it noted that the National
Environmental Policy Act, which contains the US federal EA obligations, “merely
prohibits uninformed—rather than unwise—agency action.”42
It would be an oversimplification of EA, however, to view it in purely
procedural terms. The premise behind EA is that informed and open attention
to adverse environmental effects will result in environmentally benign decision
making, as public officials will seek to adhere to the identified public purposes
of EA legislation. Public participation, which is an essential part of EA, serves
as both an informational tool, insofar as members of the public can identify
environmental and social impacts, and an accountability tool. Decision makers
are required to justify their decisions in light of the environmental impacts and
in light of the specific concerns raised by members of the public. Despite the
SCC’s characterization of EA as supplying an “objective basis” for decisions,
which suggests a purely technical role, EA is understood by many commentators
as having political and normative dimensions.43 The consultative nature of EA
provides opportunity for agencies and the public to bring power and influence to
bear on decisions, while the justificatory nature of EA requires that decisions be
justified in light of substantive normative criteria.
C. UNDERSTANDING THE TURN TO PROCESS

The key point of connection between the duty to consult and EA is the turn to
process as the primary approach to addressing substantive goals, with parallels in
both the structure of the process and the underlying justification for preferring
procedural obligations. First, both the duty to consult and EA are primarily
concerned with government decision making and involve public duties. For the
duty to consult, the focus on government arises from the special relationship
between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples. In some instances, the courts
have characterized this relationship as a fiduciary duty, but more generally, the
relationship is captured by the more flexible concept of the honour of the Crown.44
The government’s relationship to the public in relation to the environment arises
not from a special relationship, but from the status of the natural environment as
42. Robertson v Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 US 332 at 351 (1989).
43. Serge Taylor, Making Bureaucracies Think: The Environmental Impact Statement Strategy of
Administrative Reform (Stanford, Cal: Stanford University Press, 1984); Robert Bartlett
& Priya Kurian, “The Theory of Environmental Impact Assessment: Implicit Models
of Policy Making” (1999) 27:4 Pol’y & Pol 415; Neil Craik, The International Law of
Environmental Impact Assessment: Process, Substance and Integration (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2008).
44. See Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada, 2002 SCC 79 at para 81, [2002] 4 SCR 245.
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a public good. As such, the courts have recognized that safeguarding the public
interest in the environment is the responsibility of the Crown—giving rise, for
example, to the right of the Crown to recover damages for pure environmental
loss.45 While the Crown’s obligation regarding the environment does not formally
constitute a trust, there is a trust-like dimension that draws parallels with the duty
to consult.46 In both cases, the Crown is understood as the steward of resources,
the benefit of which accrues to others. This in turn requires, as a minimum, that
the Crown discharge its stewardship obligations in good faith. In both cases,
because the responsibility resides with the Crown and not a private party, such
as a resource developer, the obligations relate to the Crown’s conduct and are
triggered by the actions of the Crown.47
Since both EA and the duty to consult engage administrative discretion, the
Crown is required to exercise that discretion with reference to public values.48
In relation to EA, these values are expressed in EA legislation and relate to
public goals of sustainability, environmental protection, and meaningful public
engagement.49 The public goals of the duty to consult are the recognition and
accommodation of Aboriginal rights, which is framed as a public value through
the honour of the Crown. In both cases, however, these underlying substantive
goals are open-textured and only cognizable with reference to specific contexts.
One might suppose that EA processes would become redundant in the
face of specific standards governing air and water pollution, toxic substances,
waste management, biological diversity, and endangered species protection, as
well as land use controls.50 However, EA laws persist in the face of substantive
environmental law. One reason why EAs have not become superfluous in the face
of growing substantive environmental rules is that the avoidance of significant
environmental harm, particularly from large and complex undertakings, is
difficult to determine in the abstract. For example, most EA legislation recognizes
the importance of cumulative impacts from multiple sources, something for
45. British Columbia v Canadian Forest Products Ltd, 2004 SCC 38 at paras 72-83, [2004] 2
SCR 74 [Canfor].
46. Ibid. But note that the Court in Canfor does not go so far as to hold that the Crown can be
held legally responsible for breach of trust in the event of government failure to protect the
environment (ibid at paras 81-82).
47. CEAA, supra note 2, s 5 (listing “triggers”).
48. Roncarelli v Duplessis, [1959] SCR 121, 16 DLR (2d) 689.
49. CEAA, supra note 2, s 4.
50. Michael Herz, “Parallel Universes: NEPA Lessons for the New Property” (1993) 93:7 Colum
L Rev 1668 at 1682-83. Herz notes that under NEPA, there is an important separation
between the presence of substantive standards and EIS commitments.
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which it is difficult to develop standards.51 Ecosystem and related social impacts
are often the result of the interaction of environmental and social components,
which again requires a more holistic approach. Adherence to standards also
does not adequately inform decision makers whether the social and economic
trade-offs associated with an activity are justifiable—a determination that is again
highly context specific.
The need for contextual decision making is also integral to government
decisions affecting Aboriginal interests. The particular circumstances relating
to the strength of the claim and the potential for infringement will vary on a
case-by-case basis. So too will the government’s interests in the potentially
harmful activity.52 A set of clear substantive rules respecting accommodation is
not possible because the duties to consult and accommodate necessarily respond
to the particular facts at hand. The relationship between the duties to consult and
accommodate is further complicated by the fact that the presence of a substantive
duty cannot be determined ex ante, since part of the purpose of the duty to
consult is explore whether there is a duty to accommodate. As currently described
by the courts, the duty to accommodate has a kind of twilight existence. It does
not give rise, at least in a formal sense, to a right of consent.53 But adherence
to procedural duties alone will not satisfy the duty to accommodate, which
requires, by definition, efforts to address Aboriginal concerns.54 Like the decision
that must be made in EA, the duty to accommodate requires a balancing of
competing interests.55
Proceduralization is a product of the need for contextual decision making,
but it is also recognition of the political content of the underlying goals.56 Since
the decisions being undertaken involve the balancing of different interests that
are traditionally left to the political branches of government, the recourse to
procedure structures the nature of these interactions but not the content of the

51. This is because standards tend to be facility-specific.
52. Mikisew, supra note 1 at para 63.
53. Ibid. For discussions on obligations of the Crown where Aboriginal title is demonstrated
on proven claims, see Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44 at para 76,
[2014] 2 SCR 257.
54. Haida, supra note 1 at para 49.
55. Ibid. In Haida the Court noted that “the Crown must balance Aboriginal concerns
reasonably with the potential impact of the decision on the asserted right or title and with
other societal interests” (at para 50).
56. See Gunther Teubner, “How The Law Thinks: Toward A Constructivist Epistemology Of
Law” (1989) 23:5 Law & Soc’y Rev 727.
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outcome.57 Accommodation is a process of “balance and compromise” between
Aboriginal groups and the Crown. Reconciliation, which, as mentioned, is the
underlying goal of the duty to consult and accommodate, ought to be a product
of negotiation rather than litigation.58 The turn to procedure respects the primacy
of the political branches in the reconciliation process.
Acknowledgement of the political nature of the decision-making process
is also evident within EA processes. The decision to proceed with an activity
is left to the discretion of the responsible agency, which must account for the
results of the EA, but is not bound by it. While substantive norms shape the
political process by creating burdens of justification on government decision
makers, agencies retain control over the exercise of this discretion.59 Process does
not serve to take politics out of the decision-making process, but rather requires
that the government engage in a form of decision making that is transparent,
participatory, and justificatory.60
Both sets of obligations blur the distinction between process and substance
by imposing an informal substantive legal rationality on the decision-making
process. The principles that guide the exercise of authority are substantive in
the sense that they are intended to influence the outcome of the decisions.
EA processes are, for example, meant to result in the avoidance of adverse
environmental impacts. Decisions that engage the duty to consult are intended
to lead to the avoidance of adverse impacts to those interests. The substantive
obligations, owing to their inchoate and contextual nature, find expression in
the commitment to principled decision making through the requirement for
justification in light of shared substantive values. The standard of review of the
adequacy of this justification is reasonableness, which recognizes the superior
position of the original decision maker to assess the application of principles

57. David Dyzenhaus & Evan Fox-Decent, “Rethinking the Process/Substance Distinction:
Baker v Canada” (2001) 51:3 UTLJ 193 at 214.
58. Haida, supra note 1. Consultation “seeks to further an ongoing process of reconciliation by
articulating a preference for remedies ‘that promote ongoing negotiations’” (ibid at para 14).
See Rio Tinto, supra note 10 at para 38. See also Beckman, supra note 4. Justice Deschamps
makes this point, noting that the “objective of reconciliation of course presupposes active
participation by Aboriginal peoples in the negotiation of treaties, as opposed to a necessarily
more passive role and an antagonistic attitude in the context of constitutional litigation”
(ibid at para 103).
59. The identity of decision makers varies from system to system, ranging from individual
administrative delegates to cabinet level decision makers.
60. Craik, supra note 43 at 280.
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to the often-complex factual context.61 While not subject to strict judicial
supervision, normative justification is nonetheless constraining in that it reduces
the available courses of action open to the government. The public nature of the
justification contributes to the substantive constraints because the acceptance or
non-acceptance of the reasons put forward can contribute to the government’s
ultimate political authority on the respective claim.62
There is a strong emphasis on good faith within both processes. Good faith
does not require that the government abandon its own interests in favour of those
potentially affected by its decisions, but it does require a demonstration that the
government make a genuine attempt to understand the interests of other parties
and to assure those parties that their views have been accounted for. While good
faith is largely determined with reference to how decisions were undertaken,
there is also a substantive element that requires reasons to be given in order to
demonstrate that the decision was made in accordance with the objectives of the
respective obligations.
The turn to process also reflects a more sociological understanding of how
process obligations may influence substantive outcomes. Both EA and the duty
to consult would appear to embrace the possibility that adherence to procedural
requirements will result in social learning by the participants with the potential to
internalize shared norms.63 By creating conditions that make genuine deliberation
possible, participants may reconsider their interests in light of factual and normative
information. EA was developed in part as a response to the failure of public
agencies to consider environmental matters in the exercise of their discretion.64
EA underscored the idea that environmental considerations ought to form a part
of all good public decision making. Similarly, the duty to consult responded to
the failure of the Crown and the courts (in injunction proceedings) to properly
account for Aboriginal interests in government decisions.65 Internalization of
norms is not guaranteed, and the supposed transformational effects of process are

61. Haida, supra note 1. See also Sossin, supra note 29.
62. Dyzenhaus & Fox-Decent, supra note 57.
63. See e.g. John Sinclair & Alan Diduck, “Public Involvement in EA in Canada: A
Transformative Learning Perspective” (2001) 21:2 Envtl Impact Assessment Rev 113; Robert
Bartlett, “Rationality and the Logic of the National Environmental Policy Act” (1986) 8
Envtl Professional 105 at 109-10 [Bartlett, “Environmental Policy Act”].
64. Lynton Caldwell, “Beyond NEPA: Future Significance of the National Environmental Policy
Act” (1998) 22:1 Harv Envtl L Rev 203 at 208.
65. R v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507 at para 31, [1996] SCJ No 77; Delgamuukw v British
Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010 at para 186, [1997] SCJ No 108.
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the subject of criticism in both EA and the duty to consult.66 Nonetheless, the
stated goal of both processes remains one of integrating competing sets of values
into a shared vision, best captured in the concept of sustainable development that
underlies EA and in Justice Binnie’s description of reconciliation as leading to “a
mutually respectful long-term relationship.”67
Despite these similarities, there are also important differences in the
nature of these obligations. The environmental interests that EA addresses are
the interests that all citizens share in relation to the natural environment. EA
originated in part as an acknowledgement that all citizens have an interest in
maintaining environmental resources.68 Because these interests are shared, they
are what I would classify as “stakeholder” interests, and are subsumed as part
of the broader public interest.69 As a consequence, the interests protected are
not superior to other elements of public interest, and may be traded-off against
other public priorities, including development interests. In recognition of the
government’s superior position in determining the public interest, courts have
granted agencies implementing EA rules broad discretion to determine how best
to balance competing interests.
The interests protected by the duty to consult are of a different character.
The difficulty is that the character is variable depending upon the strength of
claim. At the high end, where the interests are either proven rights or rights that
possess high prima facie strength, the rights cannot be easily traded off. Given
their constitutional nature, they are in effect superior to other public interests.
This does not make those rights absolute, but it does require compelling and
substantive reasons to justify infringement.70 Even in cases where the strength
of claim is lower, the interests remain underlain by the potential existence of
a future, proven right. The potential and underlying substantive content that
attaches to Aboriginal interests is significant across the entire spectrum of the
duty to consult because it is through the duty to consult that the nature of the
interests reveals itself. As a result, the process always operates in the shadow of
substantive Aboriginal rights.
Unlike environmental interests, Aboriginal rights, which are held collectively
by an identifiable group, are defined in opposition to the “broader community
66. Joseph Sax, “The (Unhappy) Truth about NEPA” (1973) 26:2 Okla L Rev 239 [Sax,
“NEPA”]; Newman, supra note 29 at 105.
67. Beckman, supra note 4 at para 10, Binnie J; NEPA, supra note 2, s 101 (“goal of
sustainability”).
68. NEPA, supra note 2, s 101.
69. Canfor, supra note 45 at para 155.
70. Sparrow, supra note 19 at 1113.
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as a whole.”71 Whereas environmental interests can be entirely subordinated to
other public interests, such as economic development, Aboriginal rights, which
are constitutionally protected and independent of Crown authority, cannot
be so easily subordinated. Since the duty to consult is oriented towards the
reconciliation of “prior Aboriginal occupation of the land with the reality of
Canadian sovereignty,”72 the Crown must temper the exercise of its sovereignty
with the rights of self-determination and cultural self-expression that inhere in
the fact of prior occupation.

II. IMPLEMENTING THE DUTY TO CONSULT THROUGH
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT
A. DEFINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EA AND THE DUTY TO
CONSULT

The question of whether the Crown could implement the duty to consult through
its existing EA processes arose in Taku River,73 a case that the SCC decided in
2004 along with Haida.74 The case concerned a proposal to build a road through
the Taku River Tlingit First Nation’s (TRTFN) traditional lands. TRTFN had
participated in an environmental assessment process for the road under British
Columbia’s Environmental Assessment Act.75 The SCC found that TRTFN was
entitled to consultation in the middle to high range of the spectrum: “TRTFN
was entitled to something significantly deeper than minimum consultation
under the circumstances, and to a level of responsiveness to its concerns that can
be characterized as accommodation.”76
Under the process in place in British Columbia at the time, the EA process
was coordinated through a Project Committee. TRTFN participated in the
Committee process. It had an opportunity to review the many reports and
studies produced in support of the project and was able to voice its concerns with
the project as proposed. Ultimately, the project was recommended for approval,
although TRTFN had outstanding concerns. TRTFN appealed the decision on
the basis that the EA process was an inadequate form of consultation. The SCC

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

R v Gladstone, [1996] 2 SCR 723, [1996] SCJ No 79 at para 73 [Gladstone].
Haida, supra note 1 at para 26.
Supra note 1.
Supra note 1.
Environmental Assessment Act, SBC 2002, c 43, s 29.1.
Taku River, supra note 1 at para 32.
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found that the EA process fulfilled the requirements of the duty to consult in
this instance.77
The principal legal finding of the Court was that the duty to consult does
not require the development of special consultation measures, but rather can
be satisfied through existing schemes, such as the EA process.78 In coming to
this conclusion, the SCC was careful to review in considerable detail the specific
elements of the scheme. Given the variability of the duty to consult and EA
processes, courts will be required to look behind the particular scheme to ensure
that its application meets the requirements of the level of consultation that must
be afforded in the circumstances. In this case, while the duty was determined to
be near the high end of the spectrum, the particulars of the EA scheme satisfied
that onus. The following features of the EA scheme were salient in this regard: (1)
TRTFN participated directly as a member of the Project Committee (a statutory
requirement);79 (2) several time extensions were granted to allow TRTFN more
time to respond to information;80 (3) TRTFN was given financial assistance
to facilitate its participation;81 (4) government officials and the consultants
who prepared the EA held numerous meetings with the TRTFN to discuss its
concerns;82 (5) TRTFN’s concerns were set out and “meaningfully discussed”
in the Project Report;83 (6) the Project Report included mitigation strategies
to address TRTFN’s concerns, and these strategies were incorporated into the
project approval conditions;84 and (7) the permitting process for the project
provided further opportunities for TRTFN’s concerns to be addressed.85
Matching the requirements of the duty to consult with the EA process,
the key elements of the EA process were that: (1) TRTFN was provided with
notice and full disclosure of the project details and impacts; and (2) TRTFN was
given ample opportunity to understand how their interests were affected and to
voice their concerns and have those concerns responded to meaningfully. The
presence of mitigation measures that sought to address TRTFN’s concerns was
understood by the Court as a form of accommodation.86 The SCC noted that
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Ibid at paras 22, 40.
Ibid at para 40.
Ibid at para 3.
Ibid at para 11.
Ibid at para 37.
Ibid at para 38.
Ibid at para 41.
Ibid at para 44.
Ibid at para 46.
Ibid at para 44.
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the EA process itself was adapted to meet the concerns of TRTFN.87 Taku River
should be understood to stand for the proposition that the duty to consult may
be implemented through EA in principle, but each case will be determined on
its own merits in light of the particulars of the actual process carried out and
the level of consultation and accommodation demanded in the circumstances. It
should also be noted that the British Columbia EA process in place at the time
that Taku River was decided provided for a high level of engagement that is not
present in other jurisdictions, and has since been amended.88
The issue of EAs was also raised incidentally in Haida, where the SCC
in its discussion of the duty on third parties (particularly project proponents)
indicated that while the duty to consult cannot itself be delegated, the “Crown
may delegate procedural aspects of consultation to industry proponents seeking
a particular development; this is not infrequently done in environmental
assessments.”89 The distinction that the SCC is making between “procedural”
and non-procedural aspects of consultation is not entirely clear, particularly in
light of the process-oriented nature of the duty as a whole. However, if viewed
in light of Taku River, the EA process provides for a delegation to industry
proponents of the conduct of the study, subject to defined terms of reference.
During this process it is not uncommon for the proponent, typically through a
consultant, to engage the public and other agencies in defining the scope of the
study, identify public concerns, and, where appropriate, recommend mitigation
measures to address those concerns. At the end of this process, the findings are
communicated (usually in a report) to the statutory decision maker. In Taku
River, the recommendations were made to the Executive Director of the EA
division, who then made a recommendation to the Minister. As a result, the
Crown, through the Minister, was ultimately responsible for the approval, and
the Minister had a full record of the concerns of TRTFN and the measures of
how they were addressed.
The issue of the adequacy of EA has arisen in subsequent cases. In Ka’A’Gee
Tu First Nation v Canada, the adequacy of regulatory processes, including the
EA process, was contested by the KTFN.90 In its decision, the Federal Court
confirmed that EA processes could satisfy the duty to consult, but that process
must provide meaningful consultation throughout the approvals process.
87. Ibid at para 2.
88. Environmental Assessment Act, supra note 75. Taku River considers the process under the prior
Environmental Assessment Act, RSBC 1996, c 199. See Taku River, supra note 1.
89. Haida, supra note 1 at para 53.
90. KTFN, supra note 25 at para 30.
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At issue in the case was a modification to the project that occurred after the
consultation with the KTFN. While the process on the original proposal was
the subject of adequate consultation, the Crown could not unilaterally modify
the project without providing KTFN a further opportunity to have input on the
modified activity.91 The process undertaken was in accordance with the statutory
requirements, which did not require further consultation on modifications, but
the Federal Court found the process failed to satisfy the duty to consult, noting
that it is not enough to rely on a statutory process. The Crown’s constitutional
duty must take precedence. In the Federal Court’s words, “the Crown’s duty to
consult cannot be boxed in by legislation.”92
A judicial consensus is emerging that statutory processes designed to satisfy
other regulatory requirements, such as EA, may satisfy the duty to consult, so
long as “in substance an appropriate level of consultation is provided.”93 In cases
where the statutory process on its own is adequate, Aboriginal groups cannot
insist on a separate and discrete consultation process with the Crown.94 In one
case, the Federal Court went so far as to say that where statutory processes are
accessible and adequate, Aboriginal groups have a “responsibility to use them.”95
This is more likely to occur at the low end of the consultation spectrum. Where
consultation requirements are more onerous, as in Taku River and Ka’A’Gee Tu
First Nation, the statutory processes may need to be adjusted or supplemented
in order to meet the constitutional requirements.96 This is not an insignificant
challenge, as there are high degrees of variability in what the duty to consult
will require in each instance, and in the manner by which the EA is structured
alongside other regulatory approval processes.
One further aspect of the relationship between the duty to consult and
EA is that even where an alternative consultation process is contemplated, the
Crown may nevertheless have an obligation to ensure that there is adequate
consultation within the EA. In Nlaka’pamex Nation Tribal Council v British
Columbia, the statutory process for determining the terms of reference for an EA
91. Ibid at paras 120, 124.
92. Ka’a’Gee Tu First Nation v Canada (Attorney General), 2007 FC 763 at para 121, [2007]
FCJ No 1006 [KTFN, 2007].
93. Beckman, supra note 4 at para 39. See also Conseil des innus de Ekuanitshit v Canada
(Procureur général), 2013 FC 418 at 113, [2013] FCJ No 466 [Innu] (“[I]t is now a well
accepted practice that Crown consultation can take place through CEAA’s EA process”).
94. Brokenhead Ojibway First Nation v Canada (Attorney General), 2009 FC 484 at para 42,
[2009] FCJ No 608 [Brokenhead].
95. Ibid.
96. Taku River, supra note 1; KTFN, supra note 25 at para 112.
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process, including which groups had to be consulted as part of the EA process,
excluded the Nlaka’pamex Nation Tribal Council (NNTC).97 The Environmental
Assessment Office did propose consultations outside of the EA process, but the
British Columbia Court of Appeal (BCCA) held that “[d]enying the NNTC
a role within the assessment process is denying it access to an important part
of the high-level planning process,” and as such, consultation outside the EA
process could not be a “substitute for consultations within the assessment process
itself.”98 The Crown had argued that in the circumstances, the proposed form
of consultation was most efficient and that it was simply seeking to “balance
its obligation to consult with its obligation to carry out its statutory duty in
an effective manner.”99 As in other cases, however, the SCC recognized that the
constitutional duty took priority and that efficiency rationales could not be used
to compromise the duty to consult.
This decision points to the inseparability of EA from the duty to consult. The
SCC recognized that key aspects of the project would be determined through
the EA process, and that consultations could not be meaningful because they
were separated from that process and therefore from the broader decision-making
process that could affect Aboriginal rights. The practical implication of the NNTC
decision is that even where the Crown is engaged in parallel consultations, it
must consider whether other regulatory processes may influence Aboriginal
rights, in which case the Crown is likely obligated to provide appropriate levels
of consultation within those regulatory processes.
This implication may also work the other way: Where Aboriginal
consultations result in major project changes, the revised project may need to
be the object of additional public participation through the EA process. Because
the Crown must balance its obligations to Aboriginal peoples with other public
interest concerns, it may face restrictions in its ability to consult with Aboriginal
groups to the exclusion of other interested parties. These latter interests may
trigger administrative law protections, but in the EA context they are most likely
addressed through statutory public participation requirements.
B. CURRENT GOVERNMENT PRACTICES

The federal and provincial governments have indicated a clear preference
to use EA processes where they apply to fulfill the duty to consult, and have
97. Nlaka’pamux Nation Tribal Council v British Columbia, 2011 BCCA 78, 198 ACWS
(3d) 886 [NNTC].
98. Ibid at para 97.
99. Ibid at para 68.
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increasingly institutionalized their approach in government policy. For example,
the federal government’s guide to Aboriginal Consultation and Accommodations:
Updated Guidelines for Federal Officials to Fulfill the Duty to Consult, states that
“The Government of Canada will use and rely on, where appropriate, existing
consultation mechanisms, processes and expertise, such as environmental
assessment and regulatory approval processes in which Aboriginal consultation
will be integrated, to coordinate decision making and will assess if additional
consultation activities may be necessary.”100 The approach seeks, as far as practical,
to integrate the duty to consult with the EA process, and with regulatory
processes. In order to coordinate this process across the various departments of the
federal government, the Federal Guidelines identify the Canadian Environmental
Assessment Agency as the Crown consultation coordinator, and clarifies the roles
of other participants, such as other responsible authorities, proponents, and,
other regulatory agencies in the EA process.101
Provincial governments have likewise sought to integrate consultation within
their EA processes.102 In a number of cases, the provincial guidelines explicitly
incorporate directions to project proponents to carry out the “procedural aspects
of consultation.”103 For example, the BC Guide to Involving Proponents when
Consulting First Nations in the Environmental Assessment Process explicitly identifies
which matters are “procedural aspects” of consultation and which matters cannot
be delegated. The areas subject to delegation include:
• Providing information about the proposed project to First Nations
early in planning process;
• Obtaining and discussing information about specific Aboriginal
interests that may be impacted with First Nations;
• Considering modifications to plans to avoid or mitigate impacts to
Aboriginal Interests; and

100. Federal Guidelines, supra note 31 at 14.
101. Ibid.
102. British Columbia, Environmental Assessment Office, Guide to Involving Proponents when
Consulting First Nations in the Environmental Assessment Process (Victoria: Ministry of
Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation, 2013) [BC Guide]; Saskatchewan, Environmental
Assessment Branch, Consultation with First Nations and Métis in Saskatchewan Environmental
Impact Assessment: Guidelines for Engaging and Consulting with First Nations and Métis
Communities in Relation to Environmental Assessment in Saskatchewan (Regina: Ministry of
Environment, 2014) [Saskatchewan Guide].
103. BC Guide, supra note 102 at 4; Saskatchewan Guide, supra note 102 at 4.
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•

Documenting engagement, specific Aboriginal interests that may
be impacted, and any modifications to address concerns, and
providing this record to EAO.
The following decisions remain the responsibility of the Crown:
• The strength of a First Nation’s claimed Aboriginal rights or title;
• Whether Crown decisions regarding a proposed project represents
potential infringements of treaty rights; and
• The adequacy of the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate.104
In addition to general guidelines, governments have developed consultation
frameworks on a case-by-case basis. For example, the federal government has
developed Aboriginal consultation frameworks setting out how the federal
government will conduct consultation in the context of complex regulatory
proceedings involving administrative tribunals, such as review panels under
the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA).105 The role of tribunals
in satisfying the duty to consult was considered in Beckman, and some of the
complications as they relate to EA proceedings are discussed below. The practice
that is emerging is to distribute consultation activities across different phases
of the approvals process and use the hearing process as the central vehicle for
consultation, although inserting opportunities for direct consultation with the
Crown.106 The result in these cases is a separation between the “procedural aspects”
104. BC Guide, supra note 102 at 3. See also Responsible Energy Development Act, SA 2012,
c R-17.3, s 21 (noting that the Regulator is prevented from assessing adequacy of
Crown consultation).
105. Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, “Aboriginal Consultation Framework
for the Northern Gateway Pipeline Project” online: <http://www.ceaa.gc.ca/050/
documents/40955/40955E.pdf> [“Northern Gateway”]; Canadian Environmental
Assessment Agency, “Federal Aboriginal Consultation Framework for the Lower Churchill
Hydroelectric Generation Project” (13 August 2010) online: <http://ceaa.gc.ca/050/
documents/44762/44762E.pdf>.
106. Northern Gateway, supra note 105. For example, in the approvals process for the Northern
Gateway pipeline, which required both an EA and approval of the National Energy
Board, the Consultation Framework identified five distinct phases: (1) Involving initial
engagement of potentially affected Aboriginal groups and consulting on the development of
the Joint Review Panel (JPR) process; (2) Involving the lead to the JRP, where information
is exchanged among the parties; (3) The hearing itself, including the preparation by the
JRP of its reports and recommendations, which may include recommendations aimed at
accommodation, but may not include determinations as the strength of Aboriginal claims or
the adequacy of consultation; (4) Consultation with the Crown Consultation Coordinator
on the JRP EA report, which is reported to the Cabinet, which then makes a determination
on the government’s response to the JRP report; and (5) Involving additional consultation on
further regulatory approvals.
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of the duty from the decision itself. This has lead governments to restrict the
mandates of some consultation bodies by preventing those bodies from making
determinations of the strength of claim and from assessing the adequacy of the
Crown’s fulfillment of the duty to consult.107
C. SPECIFIC IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
1.

APPLICATION AND SCREENING

Picking up on the point above, the Crown will need to make a determination as
to whether a regulatory process engages the duty to consult and at which point
within that process consultation ought to be commenced. Within EA processes,
the initial determinations of whether an EA shall be conducted and, if so, what
form the EA shall take, are referred to as screening processes. Under current
federal rules, the government has almost unconstrained discretion to determine
whether an EA should be conducted,108 but under prior legislation a full EA
was triggered where a project was determined to have a likelihood of having a
significant environmental impact.109
The basic rule respecting when the duty to consult arises was stated in
Haida as occurring “when the Crown has knowledge, real or constructive, of the
potential existence of the Aboriginal right or title and contemplates conduct that
might adversely affect it.”110 The obligation, which relates to Crown conduct, is
much broader than the application of EA, which is typically restricted to physical
projects.111 The different scope of application has led to some difficult practical
questions about when consultation needs to be engaged. One source of difficulty
is that project-planning processes are not necessarily discrete activities, but rather
occur in the context of other enabling decisions on policies and programs.
This issue first arose in Haida, which involved the granting of a tree farm
licence. The tree farm licence did not authorize the harvesting of trees, which
required further permits. The BC government argued that while it did not consult
at the stage of granting the tree farm licence, it intended to consult prior to the
107. Ibid.
108. CEAA, supra note 2, s 10.
109. Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, SC 1992, c 37, s 20 [CEAA, 1992]. Under this Act,
a comprehensive EA was required for projects identified by regulation. Where not specifically
included in regulation, a screening EA was conducted. If the EA indicated a likelihood of
significant effect, or if it was uncertain about impacts or public concerns warranted, it would
require the responsible authority to refer the project to mediation or a review panel. Federal
EAs apply only to activities that involve identified federal ‘triggers.’ See ibid, s 5.
110. Haida, supra note 1 at para 35.
111. See e.g. CEAA, supra note 2, s 2(1) (defining “designated project”).
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issuance of cutting permits. In holding that the duty to consult applies to the
tree farm licence, the SCC recognized that the strategic-level decision strongly
influenced the subsequent outcomes, and leaving consultation to a later stage
would prevent meaningful consultation.112 The extension of the duty to consult
to “strategic, higher level decisions”113 was confirmed by the SCC in Rio Tinto,
which noted that the duty ought to include decisions respecting higher-level or
structural changes to resource management schemes, as those changes may “set
the stage for further decisions that will have a direct adverse impact on land
and resources.”114
A form of strategic planning is often associated with large scale, complex
development processes, such as pipelines or large facilities that engage multiple
regulatory processes, often across jurisdictions. For example, the Mackenzie gas
pipeline spans multiple jurisdictions and engages EA and other environmental
regulatory requirements at territorial, provincial, and federal levels, as well as
National Energy Board approvals. In order to manage and streamline these
multiple processes, a Cooperation Plan was developed among the regulators.
Other interested parties in the proceedings, including the project proponents, were
consulted as part of the development of this process. The Dene Tha’ First Nation
was not consulted and challenged the proceedings on the basis of the Crown’s
failure to consult. In holding that the Dene Tha’s rights to consultation were
breached, the Federal Court characterized the Cooperation Plan as “strategic,”
in the sense that the issues determined through the Cooperation Plan had the
potential to adversely affect the rights of the Dene Tha’. As a consequence, the
Crown’s duty extended to the creation of the Cooperation Plan, but the Dene
Tha’ were not even given notice of the Cooperation Plan, let alone meaningfully
consulted about the process.115
While the court used the term “strategic,” the focus remains project
oriented. EA practice also includes processes for the assessment of higher-level
policy, planning, and programming decisions, often referred to as strategic
environmental assessment (SEA).116 While these processes are well developed in
other jurisdictions, they remain largely ad hoc and informal in the Canadian
112.
113.
114.
115.

Haida, supra note 1 at para 76.
Rio Tinto, supra note 10 at para 44.
Ibid at para 47.
Dene Tha’ First Nation v Canada (Minister of Environment), 2006 FC 1354 at para 3, 153
ACWS (3d) 1 [Dene Tha’, FC].
116. Robert B Gibson et al, “Strengthening Strategic Environmental Assessment in Canada:
An Evaluation of Three Basic Options” (2010) 20:3 J Envtl L & Prac 175 [Gibson et al,
“Strengthening SEA”].
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context.117 Nevertheless, the underlying justification for early consultation
suggests that the duty to consult will extend to upstream policy decisions.
Whether a preliminary proceeding will trigger the duty to consult depends
on the extent to which those earlier proceedings are likely to prejudice future
decisions. One of the benefits of integrating the duty to consult with EA is that
the EA process provides a mechanism for gathering a great deal of project specific
information on potential impacts. The context specific nature of EA allows
interested parties to understand how a proposal impacts their interests. However,
as decisions become more abstracted from the project and more diffuse and indirect
in their impact, determining whether a policy decision has an adverse impact will
become more difficult. For example, the Federal Court of Appeal in Hupacasath
First Nation v Canada (Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada) held that
the conclusion of a trade agreement that may constrain government resources
policy was too speculative to give rise to the duty to consult.118 It should also
be realized that the connection between higher-level decisions and subsequent
project-level decisions may be more apparent in hindsight.
In a case involving the Northern Gateway Pipeline process, the Gitxaala
First Nation argued that their non-involvement in a marine safety review process
that formed the background to the larger EA process on the pipeline was a
breach of their right to be consulted. In denying the claim, however, the Federal
Court found that the marine safety report did not determine any rights in the
broader approvals process and its findings could be challenged within the EA
process itself.119 The court also held that given that there was a further public
consultation established under the EA and other processes, the Gitxaala First
Nation’s objections were premature.120 The question that courts must turn their
attention to in these instances is the extent to which the prior process creates
“clear momentum” that forecloses or narrows the subsequent proceedings.121
117. See e.g. Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, The Cabinet Directive on the
Environmental Assessment of Policy, Plan and Program Proposals (Ottawa: Canadian
Environmental Assessment Agency, 2010), online: <http://www.ceaa.gc.ca/Content/B/3/1/
B3186435-E3D0-4671-8F23-2042A82D3F8F/Cabinet_Directive_on_Environmental_
Assessment_of_Policy_Plan_and_Program_Proposals.pdf>. This federal directive is
non-binding and has not found much purchase in the development process. See also Gibson
et al, “Strengthening SEA,” supra note 116.
118. 2015 FCA 4, 379 DLR (4th) 737.
119. Gitxaala Nation v Canada (Transport, Infrastructure and Communities), 2012 FC 1336 at
para 51, 224 ACWS (3d) 1 [Gitxaala].
120. Ibid at para 54.
121. Ibid at para 40, citing Sambaa k’e Dene Band v Duncan, 2012 FC 204 at paras 164-166,
[2012] FCJ No 216.
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Whether the prior process in binding is not determinative of the matter, but
rather the courts appear to look at the practical effect of the prior process. The
degree to which a subsequent process can remedy an earlier failure to consult also
appears to be a factor.122
Where the screening assessment discloses adverse impacts on Aboriginal
interests, the Crown, under EA legislation, maintains broad discretion to not
conduct an EA and to address the duty to consult in a process outside of an
EA. However, such a decision, particularly where the Aboriginal group seeks
an EA as the preferred mode of consultation, may defeat the purposes of the
CEAA, which include the promotion of “communication and cooperation with
aboriginal peoples with respect to environmental assessment.”123 Conducting
an EA may be understood as a form of accommodation itself, since systematic
identification and assessment of impacts through EA can be understood as
an appropriate and proportionate means to address those impacts. It remains
an open question whether the Crown is obligated to exercise its discretion in
relation to determining whether or not to conduct an EA in a manner that most
fully accords with its constitutional duty. At a minimum, the screening process
should be conducted in a manner consistent with the duty to consult, including
providing appropriate levels of participation and justification. Adherence to the
45-day time limit, as required under the CEAA, to the detriment of the duty to
consult, is likely to be unconstitutional.124
One further issue that is likely to arise in the screening stage is how the
assessment of the strength of claim is integrated into the EA screening process.
Properly assessing the strength of claim is critical to determining the proper level
of consultation and the choice of procedures, a central element to screening.
However, the assessment of the strength of claim often requires complex
evidence, which may be difficult to gather at the initial stages of the EA and
which the Crown and First Nations may be reluctant to fully disclose where
the claim is being contested and is subject to a broader set of negotiations. The
BCCA suggested that a failure to conduct a strength of claim assessment is
not in itself a breach of the duty to consult, but may require that the default
position be deep consultation.125 In a recent federal EA process on the Roberts
122. Ibid at para 34.
123. CEAA, supra note 2, s 4(1)(d).
124. This follows from the dicta that the “Crown’s duty to consult cannot be boxed in by
legislation.” See KTFN, 2007, supra note 92 at para 121.
125. Halalt First Nation v British Columbia, 2012 BCCA 472 at para 118, 222 ACWS (3d) 558
[Halalt]. See also NNTC, supra note 97 at para 72.
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Bank Terminal, the Aboriginal consultation guidelines state the review panel is to
“take assertions of Aboriginals rights at face value during the EA process,”126 also
suggesting that the strength of claim will be assumed, rather than assessed at this
stage of consultation.
While this approach appears to benefit Aboriginal groups by defaulting to a
deeper level of consultation, it raises questions about the meaningfulness of the
consultations that follow. Those engaging in consultation on behalf of the Crown
are making recommendations on the acceptability of impacts and mitigation
measures, which is a form of accommodation. Meaningful consultation on
these matters would seem to require some understanding of the nature of the
interests and the strength of claim being asserted. The ultimate decision makers
can turn their attention to the adequacy of accommodation,127 but conducting
the EA without a clear strength of claim analysis leaves the Aboriginal group
conducting consultations with Crown agents that may only be partially aware of
what is at stake.
2.

SCOPING

Once a decision has been made to conduct an EA, the next stage in the EA
process is the determination of which issues ought to be addressed through the
EA process. This stage is referred to as scoping. The range of issues addressed by
EA is potentially broad enough to include most of the issues that will arise in
the context of the duty to consult.128 In the case of the CEAA, the definition of
“environmental effects” explicitly includes a broad range of effects on Aboriginal
peoples, including impacts on “health and socio-economic conditions, physical
and cultural heritage, the current use of lands and resources for traditional
purposes, or any structure, site or thing that is of historical [or] archeological
… significance.”129 The effects must arise from changes to the environment that
relate to the project. The restriction to “current” use of lands and resources for
traditional purposes may be overly restrictive to fully account for the interests
that are protected by the duty to consult. The scope of effects considered here
126. Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, “Aboriginal Consultation and Environmental
Assessment Handout” (November 2014), online: <www.ceaa.gc.ca/050/documents/
p80054/100180E.pdf>.
127. Brokenhead, supra note 94 at para 25.
128. Again, there is some variation across federal, provincial, and territorial EA systems in relation
to the scope of assessments. Generally, the scope focuses on bio-physical impacts, but
includes health, socio-economic, and cultural impacts that arise from environmental change.
See CEAA, supra note 2, s 5(2)(b).
129. CEAA, supra note 2, s 5(c) [numbering omitted; emphasis added].
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should be interpreted to be consistent with scope of the constitutional rights
being asserted, an approach that is consistent with the broader purposes of
the Act.130 What is clearly excluded from the process are broader questions of
unresolved land claims.131
An area of growing importance in relation to the scope of assessment
is the degree to which cumulative effects are assessed. Assessing cumulative
environmental effects requires consideration of the impact of the activity under
review, while taking into account the combined effect from other activities that
have been or will be carried out.132 The significance of cumulative effects in the
context of the duty to consult was acknowledged by the SCC in Beckman, where
Justice Binnie noted that “the severity of the impact of land grants, whether
taken individually or cumulatively, properly constituted an important element of
consultation.”133 The Federal Court in Brokenhead similarly commented, “While
the environmental footprint of any one project might appear quite modest, the
eventual cumulative impact of development on the rights and traditional interests
of Aboriginal peoples can be quite profound.”134 This sentiment is repeated by the
British Columbia Supreme Court (BCSC) in Taseko Mines Limited v Phillips,
an injunction case where, in holding the balance of convenience favoured the
Aboriginal group, the court noted:
Each new incursion serves only to narrow further the habitat left to them in which
to exercise their traditional rights. Consequently, each new incursion becomes
more significant than the last. Each newly cleared trail remains a scar, for although
reclamation is required, restoration is impossible. The damage is irreparable. It
follows that if only a portion of the proposed new clearings and trails prove to be
unnecessary, the preservation of that portion is vital.135

Cumulative effects could influence the determination of the strength of
claim insofar as the Haida test requires courts to consider the impact of the
development on the exercise of the asserted rights. A project, when considered in
isolation, may have only a minor impact, such as early stage mineral exploration,
giving rise to a duty at the low end of the duty to consult spectrum. However,
when considered in combination with other activities, the impact may be more
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Ibid, s 4.
Brokenhead, supra note 94 at para 27.
CEAA, supra note 2, s 19(1)(a).
Beckman, supra note 4 at para 21.
Brokenhead, supra note 94 at para 28.
Taseko Mines Limited v Phillips, 2011 BCSC 1675 at para 65, 64 CELR (3d) 84 [Taseko].
See also Lameman v Alberta, 2012 ABCA 59, 348 DLR (4th) 45; Lameman v Alberta, 2011
ABQB 40, [2011] AJ No 82.
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profound, leading to a more extensive duty to consult and accommodate.
Addressing cumulative effects poses a significant challenge to the efficient
management of EA in Aboriginal contexts and may increasingly push regulators
towards planning and licensing models that can account for multiple projects.136
SEA may provide some basis to assess cumulative effects where the upstream
policy or plan considers impacts on a regional scale. But to date the available
tools to perform these kinds of assessments are poorly developed, and continue
to lead to disputes respecting the assessment of cumulative impacts over time.137
There has been some controversy surrounding whether consideration of
impacts from existing and approved projects contravenes the holding in Rio
Tinto—i.e., that the duty to consult does not extend to consultation on the
impacts of past projects.138 This issue was raised squarely in West Moberly First
Nations v British Columbia (Chief Inspector of Mines).139 In this case, the central
issue was the impacts of a coalmine exploration and sampling project on caribou
herds that had already been significantly depleted. The decision to approve, which
did not fully consider the cumulative impacts of the past activities or the future
development of the mine, was stayed pending further consultation. In upholding
the BCSC’s decision, the BCCA distinguished Rio Tinto, noting that the West
Moberly First Nations (WMFN) was not seeking consultation on past decisions,
but rather was seeking consultation of the impacts from the proposal in light of
the severely degraded ecological conditions that prevailed:
I do not understand Rio Tinto to be authority for saying that when the “current
decision under consideration” will have an adverse impact on a First Nations right,
as in this case, that what has gone before is irrelevant. Here, the exploration and
sampling projects will have an adverse impact on the petitioners’ treaty right, and
the historical context is essential to a proper understanding of the seriousness of the
potential impacts on the petitioners’ treaty right to hunt.140

136. See Fort McKay First Nation v Alberta (Minister of Environment and Sustainable Resource
Development), 2014 ABQB 393, [2014] AJ No 683 [Fort McKay]; Dene Tha’ First
Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Energy and Mines), 2013 BCSC 977, [2013] 11
WWR 764 [Dene Tha’, BCSC]; E Ria Tzimas, “To What End the Dialogue?” (2011) 54:2
SCLR 493 at 517.
137. See Blueberry River First Nations v British Columbia, 2015 BCSC 1302, [2015] BCJ No
1600 [Blueberry].
138. Rio Tinto, supra note 10 at para 45 (“[t]he claimant must show a causal relationship… .”).
139. 2011 BCCA 247, 202 ACWS (3d) 214 [WMFN].
140. Ibid at para 117. See also Upper Nicola Indian Band v British Columbia (Environment),
2011 BCSC 388, 200 ACWS (3d) 1.
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Additionally, the court went to hold that the chambers judge did not err
in considering future impacts “beyond the immediate consequences of the
exploration permits,” and further held that “to the extent that MEMPR [the
approving regulator] failed to consider the impact of a full mining operation in
the area of concern, it failed to provide meaningful consultation.”141 This holding
is best understood in light of the prevailing practice in relation to scoping
cumulative effects, which maintains that only “likely” cumulative effects need
be considered.142
A second issue that has yet to receive significant judicial consideration is the
requirement within EA processes to consider alternatives to the proposal and the
environmental effects of those alternatives.143 Alternatives have been described
in the US National Environmental Policy Act regulations, which contain the
federal EA requirements, as “the heart of the environmental impact statement
… providing a clear basis for choice among options by the decision-maker and
the public.”144 Alternatives analysis plays a particularly important role in light of
the absence of clear quantitative standards to assess the acceptability of impacts.
Alternatives provide an evaluative substitute in the sense that the impacts from the
proposed activity can be measured against the impacts of a proposed alternative.
In relation to the duty to consult, alternatives provide a basis to assess forms of
accommodation. If a First Nation identifies a reasonable alternative that would
have less of an adverse impact on Aboriginal rights and interests, then there is,
at a minimum, a burden of justification on the Crown to demonstrate why that
alternative was not preferred.
The issue of alternatives arose in WMFN, where the WMFN put forward
what was effectively a “no action” alternative, asking that the exploration permits
be refused. This alternative was not seriously considered and no indication was
given as to why this position was impractical or unreasonable. In upholding that
141. WMFN, supra note 139 at para 125. See also Allan Adam v Canada (Minister of the
Environment), 2014 FC 1185 at para 85, [2014] FCJ No 1248; White River First Nation v
Yukon Government, 2013 YKSC 66 at para 136, 79 CELR (3d) 276 [WRFN]; Fort McKay,
supra note 136 at para 115.
142. Bow Valley Naturalists Society v Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2001] 2 FC
461 at para 41, 102 ACWS (3d) 1103. See also Canada, Minister of the Environment,
Assessing Cumulative Environmental Effects under the Canadian Environmental Assessment
Act, 2012 (Ottawa: Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, 2015) at 4 (noting that
a cumulative environmental effects assessment of a designated project must include future
physical activities that are certain and should generally include physical activities that are
reasonably foreseeable).
143. CEAA, supra note 2, s 19(1)(g).
144. Protection of Environment, 40 CFR § 1502.14 (2012).
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this failure was a reviewable error, the BCCA noted that the lack of engagement
of the WMFN’s preferred position effectively meant that the consultation
was limited to mitigation of effects and thus did not recognize the full range
of possible outcomes. This, in the court’s view, amounted “to nothing more
than an opportunity for the First Nations ‘to blow off steam.’”145 The Crown
was not required to accept the WMFN’s alternative, which would amount to a
veto, but was required to “provide a satisfactory, reasoned explanation as to why
their position was not accepted.”146 Alternatives analysis is not an established
approach to the duty to consult; nevertheless, it furthers the underlying purpose
of meaningful consultation. In particular, the notion of a preferred alternative
aligns with the idea articulated in the Sparrow test that Aboriginal groups
ought to be able to exercise their rights with minimal impairment and in their
preferred manner.147
As with other scoping decisions, the challenge will be determining the
potential range of reasonable alternatives. In some cases, such as the CEAA, the
range of alternatives to be considered may be qualified by the legislature. The CEAA
limits the requirement to consider alternatives to “alternative means of carrying
out the designated project that are technically and economically feasible.”148 This
is a fairly narrow range of alternatives, which excludes consideration of ‘no action’
alternatives or alternatives to the project itself, both of which were included in
the pre-2012 version of the CEAA.149 However, the range of preferred alternatives
sought by Aboriginal groups may be much broader and a statutory requirement
that limits alternatives to those that are economically feasible may subordinate
Aboriginal rights to economic considerations without clear justification on the
facts.150 In these circumstances, an overly restrictive approach to consideration of
alternatives in EA is out of step with the duty to consult.

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

WMFN, supra note 139 at para 149.
Ibid at para 148.
Sparrow, supra note 19.
CEAA, supra note 2, s 19(1)(g); CEAA, 1992, supra note 109, s 16(2)(b).
CEAA, 1992, supra note 109, s 16. Included as permissive factors to consider were
“alternatives to” the project (ibid, s 16(1)(e)) and to consider the “need” for the project (ibid,
s 16(2)(c)), effectively raising the ‘no action’ alternative. See also Meinhard Doelle, “CEAA
2012: The End of Federal EA As We Know It?” (2013) 24 J Envtl L & Prac 1 at 13.
150. See CEAA, supra note 2, s 19(1)(j). Note that nothing prevents the Crown from considering
a broader range of factors if it chooses.
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3.

PARTICIPATION

There are several important differences in relation to the participation requirements
under EA and the duty to consult. First, Aboriginals are entitled to be consulted as
First Nations, and not simply as members of the general public. Thus, in Mikisew,
it was held that a public forum was not a substitute for formal consultation.151 Even
at the lower end of the spectrum, as was the case in Mikisew, “engagement ought
to have included the provision of information about the project addressing what
the Crown knew to be Mikisew interests and what the Crown anticipated might
be the potential adverse impact on those interests.”152 Public notice and comment
processes in relation to EA activities, including consultation on the structure of
the process and scoping, without something more, are not likely to be sufficient.153
Second, the courts have generally held that the right to consultation falls
to the Aboriginal group itself, and not individual members within the group.154
Thus, in a case involving a request for an injunction enjoining a blockade, the
individuals taking part in the blockade maintained that they had not been
consulted. The BCSC, in granting the injunction, noted that such rights were
held by the First Nation itself, and on the facts, the First Nations affected had
been adequately consulted.155 Nevertheless, individuals who belong to First
Nations will have rights as members of the public under the EA process that are
not detracted from by virtue of their membership in a First Nation, but those
rights will be of the same nature as those held by non-Aboriginals.
The more difficult question relates to who must carry out the consultations
on behalf of the Crown during the EA process. As noted, the SCC in Haida drew
a distinction between the procedural and non-procedural aspects of the duty to
consult, indicating that the former may be delegated. The practical problem that
needs to be addressed is that decision-making processes for large-scale projects are
often very complicated, involving multiple agencies, review panels, and federal
and provincial governments. The trend in EA procedure has been to seek to
reduce overlap through joint panels and substituted decision making. Mapping
the duty to consult on to these procedures is likely to present legal uncertainty.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Mikisew, supra note 1 at para 64.
Ibid.
Dene Tha’, FC, supra note 115 at para 104.
Newman, supra note 29 at 65, citing R v Lefthand, 2007 ABCA 206, 222 CCC (3d)
129 (noting that the issue was not fully closed, as arguments that some Aboriginal rights
might be individually held were made in Behn v Moulton Contracting Ltd, 2013 SCC 26,
[2013] 2 SCR 227).
155. Red Chris Development Co v Quock, 2006 BCSC 1472, 152 ACWS (3d) 706.
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For example, the issue of substitution, whereby one level of government agrees
to substitute its EA process for the process of another level, has been challenged
in the Northern Gateway pipeline process on the basis that the provincial
government cannot delegate its duty to consult to federal agencies.156
One result of the use of panels in EA processes is the parceling out of the duty
to consult among different actors with different mandates. The emerging federal
practice is to use the panel reviews as the primary mechanism for informing
Aboriginal groups of the project and receiving information from those groups on
their interests and how those interests might be affected. The panel may make
recommendations, but it has a restricted mandate that excludes determinations
on questions of strength of claim and on the adequacy of the consultation process
itself. Further consultation over the panel’s recommendations, particularly around
mitigation measures, is undertaken with the Crown Consultation Coordinator,
who in turns reports on the adequacy of consultation to Cabinet.157 On that
basis Cabinet can make an independent determination on the adequacy of the
consultation and accommodation.
The extent to which EA processes merely facilitate Aboriginal understanding
of the project, but leave consultation to a parallel process, is likely to remain a
source of tension. As noted, where consultation arises outside of the EA process,
it must nonetheless offer the possibility of modification of the project to address
impacts on Aboriginal rights in order to be meaningful. However, where the
modifications give rise to substantially different environmental consequences,
further environmental assessment and consultation with non-Aboriginal
stakeholders may be warranted.
The courts have not questioned the overall ability of these staged processes
to implement the duty to consult.158 Nonetheless, the adequacy of consultation
in these types of EA proceedings may turn on whether the resulting consultation
meets the qualitative requirement for “meaningful” consultation. WRFN
is illustrative.159 An EA evaluation report of a mine was carried out and
156. See e.g. Gitxaala, supra note 119. For the facta in the proceedings, see West Coast
Environment Law, “Legal Backgrounder—What are the Northern Gateway Court
Challenges About?” (July 2015), online: <wcel.org/category/publication/legal-backgrounderwhat-are-northern-gateway-court-challenges-about>. See also Gord Hoekstra, “First Nations
challenge B.C. government in court over Northern Gateway pipeline,” The Vancouver Sun (14
January 2015), online: <www.vancouversun.com/technology/First+Nations+challenge+gover
nment+court+over+Northern+Gateway+pipeline/10725742/story.html?__lsa=e529-fc4c>.
157. Northern Gateway, supra note 105.
158. Innu, supra note 93 at para 113.
159. Supra note 140.
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recommended against approving the mine on the basis of its potential impact on
a caribou herd that had significance for the exercise of the WRFN’s Aboriginal
rights. The Director of Mineral Resources rejected the report’s findings and
granted approval. The Director consulted the WRFN, but the consultation
did not involve a clear disclosure of the Director’s basis for rejecting the report,
which was supported by the WRFN. The court held that the duty to consult
was not met in these circumstances because the consultation did not amount to
an “exchange of views.”160 In particular, because the WRFN was not provided
with any basis for the Director’s rejection of the report, they had no opportunity
to present their views or challenge the decision. The Supreme Court of Yukon
noted that “[f ]airness and the honour of the Crown require that the First Nation
be given an opportunity and time to put forward their view when the Decision
Body, as here, is contemplating a decision completely at odds with the one that
was rendered after an in-depth consultation process.”161
One final point in relation to consultation under the EA process picks up
on Sossin’s argument that in order for consultation to be meaningful, the Crown
may be required to take positive steps to facilitate Aboriginal participation.162
Given the technical nature of EA processes and the often highly specialized
information and expertise requirements EA processes involve, adequate funding
is likely to be a potential source of contention. The potential for financial
assistance is acknowledged in relation to EA in federal and provincial consultation
guidelines,163 and in cases where the courts have upheld EA processes as satisfying
the duty to consult, such as Taku River, the Crown has provided financial
assistance.164 Aboriginal groups who seek to challenge the EA on the basis that
funding was required to facilitate meaningful consultation must demonstrate
the need for the funding clearly and cannot simply insist upon their preferred
method of participation (and its associated costs).165
4.

THE DECISION

Since both the duty to consult and EA are underlain by good faith, the provision
of reasons is of central importance. It is only through the provision of reasons
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Ibid at para 112.
Ibid at para 123.
Supra note 29 at 107.
Federal Guidelines, supra note 31 at 30; BC Guide, supra note 102 at 3.
Taku River, supra note 1 at para 37. See also KTFN, supra note 25 at para 113; Katlodeeche
First Nation v Canada (Attorney General), 2013 FC 458 at para 167, [2013] FCJ No 520;
Halalt, supra note 125.
165. Innu, supra note 93 at para 129.
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by which the Aboriginal group (in the case of the duty to consult) and the
public (in the case of EA) can assess whether the concerns raised were given
serious consideration. The challenge for reviewing courts is to separate good faith
consultations from processes that are merely intended to allow Aboriginal groups
to “blow off steam.”166
The obligation to provide reasons arises at the higher end of the consultation
spectrum.167 It is required not only in relation to the final decision, but also
in relation to interim decisions, respecting screening and scoping, for example,
that impact asserted Aboriginal rights.168 The relationship between a reasoned
justification and the duty was set out forcefully in the WMFN decision, where the
court found that the failure to provide reasons for the rejection of the WMFN’s
preferred alternative contravened the duty to consult:
To be considered reasonable, I think the consultation process, and hence the
“Rationale”, would have to provide an explanation to the petitioners that, not
only had their position been fully considered, but that there were persuasive
reasons why the course of action the petitioners proposed was either not necessary,
was impractical, or was otherwise unreasonable. Without a reasoned basis for
rejecting the petitioners’ position, there cannot be said to have been a meaningful
consultation.169

The practice under EA in relation to the provision of reasons is uneven. In
some cases, the courts have held that assessment reports cannot simply come to
bald conclusions respecting the significance of impacts, but rather must provide
some reasoned basis for the conclusions reached.170 However, high-level decisions
respecting projects often take a more declaratory form.171 In Adam v Canada
(Minister of the Environment), the Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation (ACFN)
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Mikisew, supra note 1 at para 54.
Haida, supra note 1 at para 44.
Ibid.
WMFN, supra note 139 at para 144.
Pembina Institute for Appropriate Development v Canada (Attorney General), 2008 FC
302, 80 Admin LR (4th) 74 [Pembina]. The court ruled:
I recognize that placing an administrative burden on the Panel to provide an in-depth
explanation of the scientific data for all of its conclusions and recommendations would be
disproportionately high. However, given that the Report is to serve as an objective basis for
a final decision, the Panel must, in my opinion, explain in a general way why the potential
environmental effects, either with or without the implementation of mitigation measures,
will be insignificant (ibid at para 73).
171. See e.g. CEAA, supra note 2. These revised EA rules removed a requirement to provide
reasons for not following a review panel’s recommendation found in CEAA, 1992, supra note
109, s 53(2)(c) .
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challenged a decision taken under section 52 of the CEAA that determined that
the impacts from the Jackpine oil sands expansion project, while significant,
were justified in the circumstances.172 The Cabinet decision and accompanying
decision statement provided no justification for this determination. The Federal
Court, in dismissing the appeal, stated rather opaquely that the Crown was not
required to justify the Cabinet’s decision, so long as it provided a justification
of its rejection of ACFN’s position within the broader process.173 The thrust of
the Federal Court’s decision in Adam is that so long as the Crown meets its
procedural requirements—in this case the ACFN participated in a lengthy and
extensive panel process and was further invited to make representations on
whether the report captured its concerns—and shows that it gave the Aboriginal
group’s concerns serious consideration, the duty will be satisfied.
Sossin argues that the underlying substantive nature of accommodation
imposes a greater constraint on the Crown, requiring the Crown “to show
that governments’ substantive position has been modified as a result” of
consultation.174 If Sossin is right, then a critical element of any consultation will
be assessing mitigation measures and the acceptability of impacts in light of the
strength of claim. As the strength of claim approaches the very high end, one
would expect that the justification would also approach that which is required
to justify the infringement of an established right—namely, a substantial and
compelling objective.
The prevailing approach identifies mitigation measures that, in the Crown’s
view, minimize the adverse effects to Aboriginal interests. The extent to which
the proposed activity may still adversely impact Aboriginal interests and the basis
upon which those potential impacts are justified is not readily disclosed.175 As
noted, in many instances the actual assessment is undertaken without a coinciding
strength of claim analysis and the acceptable mitigation measures are determined,
in the first instance, in the absence of knowledge of the strength of claim.
5.

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND REMEDIES FOR BREACH

The standard of review for matters involving legal interpretations of EA
legislation is correctness, while the standard for application of evidence and
exercise of discretion (i.e., questions of mixed fact and law) within EA processes

172.
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2014 FC 1185, 250 ACWS (3d) 541 [Adam].
Ibid at para 81.
Supra note 29 at 107.
Adam, supra note 172 at para 181.
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is reasonableness.176 Thus, decisions respecting screening and scoping of EAs will
be reviewed on the basis of reasonableness. In relation to the duty to consult,
the standard of review was addressed in Haida, with the accepted approach
being to review questions regarding the existence and content of the duty on a
correctness standard and questions respecting the adequacy of consultation and
accommodation on a reasonableness standard.177 Subsequent decisions have noted
that the determination of the existence of a duty, which involves assessments of
the strength of claim and the serious of the impacts, may involve findings of fact,
in which case some deference will be owed to the decision maker.178
Separating out what may constitute the “scope and extent”179 of the duty from
how that duty is discharged in the context of EA will not always be straightforward.
For example, a screening decision, which involves a determination of whether
there is a likelihood of significant environmental impact, will be treated with
deference under EA processes. However, insofar as determining the significance
of impacts on Aboriginal interests goes to the extent of the duty to consult, it may
be treated on a correctness standard, as appears to be the approach in WRFN.180
Much will turn on the extent to which the court views the determination to be
driven by factual considerations, in which case greater deference will likely be
shown. There is evidence that the approach in relation to the implementation
of the duty through EA will be looked at functionally, with the court assessing
whether the process that was followed allowed for “meaningful consultation.”
In WMFN, the BCCA effectively equated a consultation process that was not
meaningful with unreasonableness.181 What the courts recognize here is that the
consultation process itself, which often involves consultation on the form of the
EA, determines the correctness of the scope.182
In assessing the actual outcomes of EA processes, the court will again look
to the reasonableness of the decision. In doing so, however, courts need to be
mindful of the central importance of justification to the consultation process. In
other words, there is a need to assess the quality of the reasons, not so much to
ensure that the result itself is reasonable, but to ensure that the process that gave
176. Ontario Power Generation Inc v Greenpeace Canada, 2015 FCA 186 at paras 120-21,
[2015] FCJ No 1066. See also Pembina Institute for Appropriate Development v Canada
(Minister of Fisheries and Oceans), 2005 FC 1123 at paras 12-13, 141 ACWS (3d) 766.
177. Haida, supra note 1 at paras 60-63; Brokenhead, supra note 94 at para 17.
178. Wii’litswx, supra note 28 at para 15; Dene Tha’, BCSC, supra note 136 at para 99.
179. Haida, supra note 1 at para 66; Wii’litswx, supra note 28 at para 17.
180. Supra note 140 at para 95.
181. WMFN, supra note 139 at para 154. See also WRFN, supra note 140 at para 115.
182. Dene Tha’, FC, supra note 115 at para 105.
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rise to the result was meaningful and carried out in good faith. The principal form
of accommodation that is provided through EA processes is the identification of
mitigation measures that are intended to eliminate or reduce adverse impacts to
asserted Aboriginal rights. In this context, meaningful consultation suggests that
the mitigation measures, at a minimum, ought to be responsive to the preferred
alternatives put forward by Aboriginal groups.
Where there has been a breach of the procedural requirements of EA, the
courts exercise broad discretion in determining the remedy. In MiningWatch,
where Responsible Authority was found to have misapplied the scoping rules
by scoping a mining project in an overly narrow fashion, the SCC restricted
its remedy to declaratory relief, overturning a decision of the Federal Court to
require further consultation and assessment in accordance with proper scoping
requirements.183 The basis of the decision is complicated, but it included the fact
that the complaint was procedural in nature and not in relation to the substance
of the decision.184 The MiningWatch decision has been relied upon in at least
one duty to consult case involving deficient EA processes to provide support for
restricting relief to a declaration.185
Both cases may be restricted to their unique facts, but it is important to
recognize, in the context of remedies, that procedural deficiencies take on
particular importance in the context of the duty to consult precisely because the
substantive requirements are so indeterminate. The process here is to a large degree
the ends sought. Unlike purely administrative proceedings where the court’s
discretion to grant a remedy may consider the broader balance of convenience to
the parties—as in MiningWatch, where the SCC felt it was unfair to burden the
mining company with the consequences of the government’s mishandling of the
EA—the constitutional dimensions of the duty to consult militate in favour of a
robust approach to remedies.186
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III. PROCESS AND RECONCILIATION: MATCHING THEORY
AND PRACTICE
Early in the life of NEPA, the environmental law scholar Joseph Sax famously
expressed his skepticism about the underlying premise of EA:
I know of no solid evidence to support the belief that requiring articulation,
detailed findings or reasoned opinions enhances the integrity or propriety of
administrative decisions. I think the emphasis on the redemptive quality of
procedural reform is about nine parts myth and one part coconut oil.187
Since that time, EA scholars have offered a number of different approaches
to explain how adherence to procedural requirements brings about desired
environmental outcomes.188 While these approaches offer an explanatory model
for how EA affects outcomes, the approaches also tend to diverge in the role they
ascribe to EA and the structural features of EA upon which they lay emphasis.
One set of approaches, identified by Holder as informational theories, stresses
the rationality of EA planning processes and focuses on the need to develop
better technical tools and metrics for assessment, but tends to downplay value
disputes.189 Environmentally sound outcomes arise under this model because
decision makers are assumed to be able to accurately assess the costs of potentially
harmful activities and avoid or mitigate unacceptable environmental outcomes in
the public interest.190 Cultural or transformative theories, by contrast, recognize
the normative influence that environmental information has on political processes
and tend to understand that interactions involving environmental values can
have transformative effects on political interests and institutional structures.191
The emphasis under transformational approaches is on the deliberative quality of
the interactions and the justificatory nature of the decisions.
When EA is considered in light of its role as a way to implement the duty
to consult, informational approaches offer a limited framework to explain the
broader aspirations of reconciliation that underlie the duty. First, informational
approaches are premised on a single, monolithic conception of public interest.
187. NEPA, supra note 66 at 239.
188. Bartlett & Kurian, supra note 43; James Boggs, “Procedural v. Substantive in NEPA Law:
Cutting the Gordian Knot” (1993) 15:1 Envtl Professional 25; Taylor, supra note 43;
Craik, supra note 43.
189. Holder, supra note 38 at 23-24.
190. Carys Jones et al, “Evaluating the SEA of Land Use Plans” in Carys Jones et al, eds, Strategic
Environmental Assessment and Land Use Planning: An International Evaluation (Sterling, VA:
Earthscan, 2005) at 35-36.
191. Holder, supra note 38 at 27; Boggs, supra note 189; Craik, supra note 43.
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The problems that EA addresses are technical and solvable with recourse to better
technical information. The duty to consult, on the other hand, accepts a much
more pluralistic and political understanding of the decision-making processes
engaged. At the heart of the duty to accommodate is the notion of compromise
and negotiation. Accommodation is not a technical issue that can be resolved
with improved information. Second, informational approaches tend to view
participation in instrumental terms, in the sense that the object of participation
is to provide experts with additional information, whereas the duty to consult
views participation in much more dialogical terms. The duty to consult requires
an “exchange of views”192 and demands responses to alternatives proposed.
Finally, the underlying theory of legitimacy under informational approaches is
rooted in the expertise of the agency decision makers, whereas the legitimacy of
decisions arrived at through the duty to consult is premised on the deliberative
characteristics of participatory decision making. In other words, decisions are
accepted under informational theories because the process is able to identify
optimal solutions. Justification appeals to technical criteria, but is indifferent
to the normative dimensions of the decision. There is an ahistorical element to
informational approaches that fails to acknowledge the context of government
mistrust that reconciliation seeks to ameliorate—good faith is assumed under
informational theories, whereas it is required to be demonstrated under the
duty to consult.
It might seem that informational approaches present something of a straw
man, insofar as Canadian EA processes appear to embrace a more participatory
model of EA. While that may be true, the technical focus that informational
approaches suggest still has a powerful influence over how EAs are conducted
and how courts understand them.193 Recall that, in Friends of Oldman River, the
SCC described EA as providing an “an objective basis for granting or denying
approval of a proposed development,” suggesting a technical, as opposed to
political, orientation.194 Even where the courts acknowledge that EA involves “a
large measure of opinion and judgement,” the underlying disputes are described
in technical not political terms.195 The fundamental point I seek to make here
is that while EA processes, and the courts that consider them, acknowledge the
192.
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important role of participation, it is understood in instrumental terms—it is a
means to an end. It is in that regard that the Court in MiningWatch felt partially
justified in offering no substantive remedy in the face of a procedural breach,
since, in the Court’s view, there was no actual harm to the applicant, a public
interest litigant.196
One of the outstanding puzzles in relation to the duty to accommodate is
the extent to which the Crown has to affirmatively address Aboriginal concerns.
The framing of the duty as a balancing test suggests a measure of ambivalence
to outcomes, in the sense that the test provides little guidance to how that
balance is to be achieved, leaving the determination as a matter of Crown
discretion. Verónica Potes describes two competing approaches to the duty to
accommodate: (1) a “procedural” approach, which views accommodation being
satisfied by adherence to the procedural requirements of the duty to consult; and
(2) a “purposive” approach that requires adherence to substantive standards.197
The difficulty, as outlined in Part I, above, is that drawing a sharp distinction
between process and substance in this context fails to capture the dynamic
relationship between the two, and suggests that that they can be independently
assessed. Potes is sensitive to this dynamic, but does not offer a theory of how this
interaction may function.
Transformational theories better capture the essence of reconciliation, and
may even provide a way of understanding reconciliation in the institutionalized
context of project decision making. Transformational approaches do not regard
the interests and values of the participants in EA processes as fixed, but rather
understand that participation in the process itself may impact interests. Interest
reformulation is endogenous to the EA process, allowing for the possibility of
participants learning through the process and reconsidering their interests in
light of new information and shared understandings.198
Transformational theories of EA locate the legitimacy of the outcomes within
the deliberative qualities of the interactions, as opposed to the expertise of the
decision makers. Looking at the quality of interactions, which is what I would
argue is at the centre of the requirement of good faith in the duty to consult,
requires that the parties treat each other’s position with a minimum level of
respect, which in turn requires that decision makers be open to persuasion based

196. MiningWatch, supra note 39 at para 52.
197. “The Duty to Accommodate Aboriginal Peoples Rights: Substantive Consultation?” (2006)
17:1 J Envtl L & Prac 27 at 33-38. See also Sossin, supra note 29.
198. Sinclair & Diduck, supra note 63; Craik, supra note 43 at 249.
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on the arguments provided.199 The deliberative dimensions of the duty to consult
are captured in Mikisew, where Justice Binnie linked the quality of consultation
with the possibility of accommodation, noting that “consultation that excludes
from the outset any form of accommodation would be meaningless.”200
Understood through a transformational lens, the institutional deficiencies to
which EA legislation was responding were that government decision making had
“not been receptive to an adequate range of facts, had not been able to break away
from well-known formulas, and had been insufficiently critical and excessively
rigid.”201 The duty to consult responds to these same deficiencies. Justification
takes on a heightened importance because it is not simply a description of the
basis of the outcome as decided by the Crown, but is required to be reciprocal
in the sense that the reasons given must respond to the concerns raised and
must appeal to shared norms. In the context of the duty to consult, reciprocal
justification requires that decision makers carefully consider Aboriginal
perspectives and seek out justifications that incorporate Aboriginal values. The
promise of transformational approaches is that reciprocal justification offers
an opportunity for those affected by government decisions to participate in
the elaboration of the norms of evaluation. For example, the determination of
what constitutes a “significant” impact to the environment and to Aboriginal
rights ought to be arrived at jointly with due regard for both Aboriginal and
non-Aboriginal perspectives. Reconciliation can be understood as co-authorship
of the norms that shape the conditions of Aboriginal lives. The self-governing
element of co-authorship captures the need to “reconcile pre-existing Aboriginal
sovereignty with assumed Crown sovereignty,”202 and the balancing of interests.
Reconciliation fully realized suggests the possibility of the development of shared
interests, as opposed to trading off Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal interests, and
it is in this sense that the process can contribute to jurisgenerative potential of
section 35 of the Charter.203

199. Simone Chambers, “Deliberative Democratic Theory” (2003) 6:1 Ann Rev Pol
Sci 307 at 309.
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Returning to the form of EA commitments that will be required to
implement the duty to consult, certain elements of the EA process that are
more consistent with a transformational function can be identified. First, the
requirement for alternatives should be applied with full rigour. The requirement
to assess alternatives will be relevant at both the scoping and decision stages of
EA. At the scoping stage, the determination of which issues are to be assessed and
the depth of assessment will need to account for preferred Aboriginal alternatives.
At the decision stage, where alternatives have been considered, the reasons given
will need to respond to the preferred Aboriginal alternatives and provide, where
appropriate, a justification for the rejection of those alternatives.
In the absence of standards that address themselves to acceptable levels
of interference with Aboriginal interests, requiring the careful examination of
preferred Aboriginal alternatives requires the Crown to address itself to the
question of whether the same public objective can be achieved in a manner that
is less likely to infringe Aboriginal interests. This would require in circumstances
of deep consultation, not only a consideration of “alternative means of carrying
out the designated project,”204 but also “alternatives to the project.”205 The former
accepts uncritically the need for the project and that the identified project is the
preferred manner by which the underlying public objective is achieved, while
the latter gives a more fulsome voice to Aboriginal viewpoints on development
visions that impact their interests. From a justificatory standpoint, requiring the
Crown to consider alternatives promotes a dialogue over competing development
visions, but also requires the Crown to articulate in terms that address themselves
to Aboriginal interests why the Crown’s development approach is preferred.
Examining the need for the project requires justification of the Crown’s objective.
This is not to suggest that the objective has to meet the “compelling and
substantial” requirement in the Sparrow test,206 but where the strength of claim
merits deep consultation, the reconciliation goal that underlies the requirement
to show that the Crown’s objectives are of compelling and substantial importance
remains relevant.207 Alternatives analysis also captures the minimal infringement
requirement by raising a burden of justification on the Crown to demonstrate
why a less harmful (to Aboriginal interests) alternative is not preferred.208
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A second element to which greater attention is required to be paid relates to
the question of cumulative effects. The diminishment of Aboriginal rights and
interests over time and with each new development proposal is a central source
of Aboriginal frustration.209 As described above, the courts have been sensitive to
the issue of cumulative impacts on asserted Aboriginal rights, but project-based
assessment presents some limitations in the consideration of cumulative impacts
over large areas and time scales.210 The judicial recognition of the significance
of cumulative impacts militates in favour of a more strategic approach to
assessment, which would consider cumulative impacts on a regional scale.
Picking up on the discussion of alternatives, SEA allows for consultation at early
stages of development planning processes, providing for greater opportunities
for articulation of shared development priorities and expectations in advance of
specific project proposals. Other strategic tools beyond the assessment of policies,
plans, and programs (the typical domain of SEA), such as regional cumulative
impact studies and scenario building, can usefully contribute to properly
understanding the long-term implications of sustained resource development on
Aboriginal interests.
There has been broad judicial recognition of the obligation to consult at
strategic levels where decision-making processes are engaged, but this right
does not obligate the Crown to conduct strategic-level EAs where they do not
exist.211 It does, however, require some vigilance on the part of the Crown and
the courts to recognize where policy-level decisions can lead to adverse Aboriginal
impacts. In such cases, the Crown will have to assess whether a legal obligation
to consult exists.212 In doing so, the Crown needs to be sensitive to the long-term
implications on the exercise of Aboriginal rights associated with cumulative
impacts. The Gitxaala test requiring consultation where a process creates “clear
momentum” that forecloses future policy options has some application here,
suggesting consultation obligations where strategic policy decisions advance
development opportunities.213 Viewed in isolation, the impacts may suggest that
the duty to consult be considered at the low end, but understood in a more
209. Blueberry, supra note 137; Lameman v Alberta, 2013 ABCA 148, 85 Alta LR (5th) 64
(deciding on a breach of treaty rights claim based on cumulative impacts of development);
Mark Haddock, Environmental Assessment in British Columbia (Victoria: Environmental Law
Centre, 2010) at 72-73.
210. Gibson, et al, “Strengthening SEA,” supra note 116 at 192.
211. Ibid.
212. Courtoreille v Canada, 2014 FC 1244, 248 ACWS (3d) 491 (finding a duty to consult in
relation to federal legislation).
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holistic fashion, the duty may be viewed as requiring a more discursive process.
Sensitivity to the implications of government policy for future resource impacts
and their consequent affect on Aboriginal interests was recognized in Ross River
Dena Council v Government of Yukon,214 which involved the granting of exploration
rights under the Yukon’s Quartz Mining Act. In that case, the Yukon Court of
Appeal acknowledged that the requirements to implement the duty to consult
are flexible.215 Critically, the court also noted that where “serious and long-lasting
adverse effects” are present, “[t]he Crown must ensure that it maintains the ability
to prevent or regulate activities where it is appropriate to do so.”216
Providing for strategic-level EA advances a more transformative approach
to EA in that SEA processes encourage an information rich and participatory
decision-making environment at the policy level. Giving Aboriginal groups an
opportunity to shape policy and programmatic-level decisions that will then shape
project-level decisions, including shaping the availability or at least feasibility of
alternative development tracks, provides an opportunity for the development of a
common set of normative arrangements that will govern future decision making.
Such an approach is consistent with the approach by the courts to require
consultation throughout the decision-making process. Insisting on strategic-level
assessment has both procedural benefits and substantive norm-creating benefits.
The use of SEA is consistent with federal, and to some degree, provincial, EA
policy.217 The federal government has a SEA directive,218 and the purpose section
and sections 73-74 of the CEAA expressly provide for “the study of cumulative
effects of physical activities in a region and the consideration of those study
results in environmental assessments.”219
One of the reasons that cumulative effects arise is that decisions under EA
processes accept that projects will result in a harm to the environment and to
Aboriginal interests, but that these harms are either insignificant or justifiably traded
214.
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off against other public goals. The central evaluative measure for acceptability of
impacts is the minimization of adverse impacts or the avoidance of “irreversible”
harm.220 In these circumstances, small and diffuse but acceptable harms may
contribute to a broader erosion of Aboriginal interests, particularly where those
interests are understood, as they properly should be, in intergenerational terms.
From a reconciliatory standpoint, mitigation alone may offer little positive
benefit to Aboriginal communities. Impact and benefit agreements (IBA) provide
one avenue for ensuring Aboriginal participation in the economic benefits from
development, but the IBA process is a private negotiation conducted outside the
EIA process. A further option is to require projects to adhere to a more sustainably
oriented outcome that requires the project to identify positive contributions to
environmental and social outcomes from the project, referred to as sustainability
assessment.221 Gibson has noted that, on occasion, Canadian EA processes have
sought to incorporate this “higher standard” by requiring the proponent to
include in its EA documentation a discussion of the “positive overall contribution
towards the attainment of ecological and community sustainability, both at the
local and regional levels.”222 Such a reorientation, which is entirely consistent
with the objectives of EA legislation,223 moves away from viewing trade-offs as
a balancing of competing interests, towards a more integrative approach, which
looks at the long-term sustainable future of the impacted community.224 While
reconciliation itself is often described in oppositional terms (i.e., as balancing
Aboriginal interests with those of non-Aboriginals), the critical opportunity
that the integrative orientation of sustainability assessment provides is the
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opportunity for the Crown and Aboriginal groups to deliberate over a shared
development vision.225

IV. CONCLUSION
The promise of transformational approaches is that over time, as actors with
diverse interests confront those differences on the basis of reciprocal justifications,
the politics engaged in is characterized by a more reasoned and less adversarial
discourse.226 Whether EA has resulted in the internalization of environmental
values within systems of government decision making remains a controverted
matter. For his part, Joseph Sax reconsidered his skepticism regarding NEPA,
conceding that he “underestimated the influence of NEPA’s ‘soft law’ elements.”227
Several empirical assessments of the long-term impacts of EA have concluded
that EA does contribute to positive environmental outcomes and to the broader
process of norm internalization.228 There is, to be clear, nothing inevitable about
transformational approaches to EA. As Doelle229 and Gibson230 have argued in
relation to the revised structure of the CEAA, governments can move to restrict
the application of EA and insert more administrative discretion that serves to
decouple EA from its substantive environmental objectives. The intertwining of
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Duty to Protect Aboriginal Rights. A Consideration of the Supreme Court of Canada’s
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the duty to consult with EA provides an important countervailing force to the
retrenchment of the robust environmental aspirations of EA.
In this article, I have sought to take stock of the implementation of the duty
to consult through EA processes. Here I have argued that EA and the duty to
consult are to a significant degree bound together. Consequently, my intent was
not to demonstrate whether the use of EA to implement the duty to consult is
a sound policy choice, but given their necessary interrelationship, I have sought
to show that careful attention needs to be paid to the constitutional dimension
of the duty to consult along all stages of the EA process. At the heart of the duty
to consult is the stringent demand for meaningful consultation—a requirement
that cannot be neatly separated from the duty to accommodate. This, I argue,
pushes EA towards its more deliberative and justificatory construction.
None of the normative arguments I make regarding the form of EA require
a radical departure from its current function and structure. In each instance, the
Crown has the discretion to structure EA processes in ways that emphasize its
transformative potential. The constitutional nature of the duty to consult ought
to influence the exercise of that discretion in ways that are consistent with the goal
of reconciliation which, at a minimum, requires the justification of government
decisions in ways that account for Aboriginal interests and perspectives, and
provide a substantive basis for Aboriginal acceptance of the decisions made.
The argument presented here does not seek to impose a formally substantive
rationality on decisions affecting Aboriginal interests. Rather, I view both EA and
the duty to consult as forms of proceduralized obligations, whereby the process
and substance are themselves deeply intertwined. Proceduralization respects
the political content of the choices being made. In this regard, I argue that the
SCC’s approach in refraining from giving substantive content to the duty to
accommodate is sound, so long as it is accompanied by a robust understanding
of the potential of process to transform legal relationships, as well as the stringent
requirements that are necessary to realize that potential.

